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The emergence of visual media as prominent and even expected forms of 
communication in nearly all disciplines, including those scientific, has raised new 
questions about how the art and science of communication epistemologically affect the 
interpretation of scientific phenomena. In this dissertation I explore how the influence of 
aesthetics in visual representations of science inevitably creates ambiguous meanings. As 
a means to improve visual literacy in the sciences, I call awareness to the ubiquity of 
visual ambiguity and its importance and relevance in scientific discourse. To do this, I 
conduct a literature review that spans interdisciplinary research in communication, 
science, art, and rhetoric. Furthermore, I create a paradoxically ambiguous taxonomy, 
which functions to exploit the nuances of visual ambiguities and their role in scientific 
communication. I then extrapolate the taxonomy of visual ambiguity and from it develop 
an ambiguous, rhetorical heuristic, the Tetradic Model of Visual Ambiguity. The Tetradic 
Model is applied to a case example of a scientific image as a demonstration of how 
scientific communicators may increase their awareness of the epistemological effects of 
ambiguity in the visual representations of science. I conclude by demonstrating how 
scientific communicators may make productive use of visual ambiguity, even in 
communications of objective science, and I argue how doing so strengthens scientific 
communicators’ visual literacy skills and their ability to communicate more ethically and 
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“Seeing is metamorphosis, not mechanism.” 
    -James Elkins, The Object Stares Back 
 
The Scientific Visual Literacy Conundrum 
 The Inner Life of a Cell series, part of Harvard University’s BioVisions project, is a 
collection of artistically rendered simulations—complete with mesmerizing colors and 
music—that exhibit microscopic biological processes. The animations are produced and 
distributed by a by an assembly of Harvard scientists, faculty, students, and multimedia 
professionals who do not hide their bold philosophy behind the multimedia simulations: 
 
Research in the biological sciences often depends on the development of new 
ways of visualizing important processes and molecules. Indeed, the very act of 
observing and recording data lies at the foundation of all the natural sciences. The 
same holds true for the teaching and communication of scientific ideas; to see is 
to begin to understand. (Stimolo) 
 
A very serious endeavor to instruct students in the biological and life sciences, Harvard’s 
BioVisions project is intended to be much more than an entertaining, artistic composition 
of scientific phenomena (see Figure 1.1).  
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Figure 1.1: "Mitochondria," from BioVisions' Inner Life of a Cell Series 
 
Although developed to subsidiarily astound, lure, and intrigue audiences, these high-tech 
and acutely designed renderings are primarily intended to instruct with scientific 
accuracy. According to the BioVisions website, “this new generation of science 
visualizations are not meant to simply be simulations or mirrors held up to reality, rather 
they are designed with a specific pedagogical goal in mind. This means that each decision 
on how to represent a given biological process also includes consideration of how to best 
visually communicate particular aspects of the process” (Stimolo). Imbedded in this 
statement is an intriguing perspective on the way reality—the objective world—is 
epistemologically framed within the visual communication of science. Well-respected 
scientists at Harvard see the confluence of art and science in these visual representations 
as an important epistemological and pedagogical practice for clarifying the processes of 
scientific phenomena.  
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The visualization of science is nothing new, of course, but the deluge of 
technologies (such as the animation tools used at Harvard) that has recently inundated 
nearly every discipline has raised a host of questions about the pedagogies and 
epistemologies that surround such technologies. In serious scientific endeavors like the 
BioVisions project, visual representations and simulations are, undoubtedly, developed 
using intensely “rigorous scientific models” as the BioVisions website claims. Yet there 
can be no denying the epistemological influence of the perhaps more subjective, 
ambiguous interpolations of aesthetics in such representations. Further, the 
communicative decisions and the technological limitations underlying the development 
of such representations inevitably create visual ambiguities—regardless of the “scientific 
rigor” involved—that affect viewers’ interpretations.  
 The observation of a simulation of something scientific—whether it be of 
brilliantly colorful protein crystallography or of gracefully “swimming” mitochondria—
makes it difficult for most viewers to imagine what that scientific phenomenon might 
have looked or acted like previously in their mind’s eye. By the time they have viewed 
and accepted the simulation or image as part of methodical science—and hence as simply 
“accurate”—they have forgotten that they have been captivated, persuaded. As Sherry 
Turkle claims, visualizations and simulations cause viewers to get caught up in the visual 
glamour and the “dazzling environments. … We [become] witness to our own 
seduction,” she says (80).Visual elements—particularly those touted as“scientific”—
seem to have a unique and influential power to seductively persuade, causing viewers to 
believe that representations built from scientific models do not lie, and that the 
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ambiguities of their composition do not matter (or, worse, do not exist). The accusations 
against language and rhetoric as impediments to science over several centuries has made 
scientists alert to verbal nuances and ambiguities that detract or distort meaning. 
However, based on the dearth of scholarship about ambiguity in visual representations, 
we might conclude that those communicating scientific phenomena often fail to realize 
that simulations encompass visual ambiguities as well, and that what scientific 
communicators see or communicate does not necessarily tell the whole or accurate 
picture.  
 This is not to say that visualization projects such as Harvard’s BioVisions are 
inherently (or, by any means, intentionally) misleading or misguided. Without a doubt, 
students of science are gaining valuable understanding from these meticulously 
composed renderings. But the advancement and widespread use of visualization 
technologies, which more readily and frequently converges artistic practices with those 
scientific have necessarily raised questions about how viewers may unquestionably 
accept visual, simulated representations of science as mimetic duplicates of the real world 
without reflecting on the artistry and ambiguity present within the representation. The 
acquiescence to and quick embracement of scientific representations by scientists as 
accurate (or, at least, accurate enough) is an interesting conundrum that Turkle 
demonstrated in Simulation and Its Discontents. Visualization technologies are now too 
often complex beyond the knowledge of scientists who do not specialize in such 
technologies. But the questions scientists may raise have not necessarily been about 
whether or not to use visualization technologies in science (that seems a futile endeavor). 
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But appropriate answers about the communicative enigma that circulates the widespread 
use of artistically rendered visualizations in the sciences have been fragmented at best. It 
seems that answers to such questions ought to focus on how visually literate scientists 
and scientific communicators are when composing and viewing the material these 
technologies help scientists produce. And, it seems, one particularly important question 
that emerges when addressing how to improve visual literacy in the sciences regards the 
role, function, and ubiquity of visual ambiguities in scientific representations. 
 As we shall see, viewers’ understandings are shaped by the visual nuances—the 
ambiguities—that exist as a result of technological impositions and artistic, rhetorical 
choices that superimpose the raw objectivity of the scientific phenomena. Furthermore, I 
shall demonstrate how representations are displayed in perhaps even more complex 
socio-cultural contexts that share in the epistemological framing within the viewer’s 
understanding. Representations, in other words, must be contextualized within broader 
communicative frameworks in a digital age where scientists and non-scientists alike are 
being taught, in many ways, by the ambiguities in the image. 
 
Searching for a “Scientific Visual Literacy” 
Amidst an increasingly visual scientific culture, where visualization is a pervasive and 
penetrating part of most, if not all, scientific disciplines, it seems that scientific 
communicators (the scientists themselves and the people and organizations who publish 
their work) would be paying close attention to this ambiguity. It seems logical that they 
would be well-versed in the visualization techniques, theories, potentials, and the 
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rhetorical/epistemological conundrums that generate visual ambiguity. The need for such 
a “scientific visual literacy” seems imperative. A dearth of scholarship on visual 
ambiguities, particularly in the sciences, has already been mentioned, but more 
particularly, many have recently addressed a real lack of systematic attempts to increase 
literate awareness of scientific representations. According to scientific communication 
scholars: there are “remarkably few systematic attempts that have been made” at 
developing common visual theories and frameworks for the sciences (Pauwels 1); there is 
“scant research on the role of visual literacy and science visualization among scientists or 
scientific communicators” (Trumbo “Seeing Science” 386); and there has been 
“relatively little attention… directed toward the challenge of building visual literacy 
among scientists, communicators, and the public” (Trumbo “Making Science Visible” 
266). Instructional communication scholars Mayer et al. have further claimed that, 
despite scientific textbooks’ compilation consisting of approximately one-third 
illustrations, little is known about the communicative and cognitive effects of design 
elements (“A Generative Theory”); and Barbara Stafford has persuasively suggested that 
literacy education is so emphatically reliant on textual communication that “the 
aesthetic…dimensions of perception remain virtually absent from the new 
interdisciplinary matrix in which cognitive being is about to become embedded” (“Visual 
Pragmatism” 3).  Even as recent as 2005, surveys of this topic suggested that little 
attention has been given to the influences of images in the sciences. Hüppauf and 
Weingart note: 
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The conditions of [science images and] their emergence, genesis, and continued 
production, their fashions, impact on research, philosophy, and the general 
perception of nature had attracted surprisingly little interest. This indifference was 
often associated with contempt for the visual in relation to abstract discourse. (3) 
 
This lack of interest in visual literacy has continued to exist despite the fact that “life 
scientists take as a given that simulations [and visualizations] can deceive” (Turkle 59, 
italics mine) and that “beautiful images mislead because they imply a finished result even 
when research is at an early stage” (78). And there is little research done in visual literacy 
in the sciences despite the acknowledgement that we learn from visuals often “viscerally” 
rather than intellectually or empirically (57). Furthermore, visualization is not a part of 
most scientists’ training despite scientific communicators having access to myriad 
assorted technologies that facilitate the creation of images. Roald Hoffmann writes:  
 
Chemists are not selected—nor do they select themselves—for their profession on 
the basis of their artistic talents. Nor are they trained in basic art techniques. My 
ability to draw a face so that it looks like a face atrophied at age ten. So how do 
they do it, how do we do it? With ease, almost without thinking, but with much 
more ambiguity than we, the chemists, think there is. (69) 
 
Scientists in almost any field will, for various reasons from journal publications to 
presentations, produce visualizations. And they will, as Hoffmann admonishes, do it with 
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ease. The tools available make it simple and fast.  
 Hüppauf and Weingart note that scientific illustrations were historically used to 
lay claim to truth but the invention and pervasiveness of digital images has changed that. 
“This cannot be read,” they say, “but as a plea for developing a new image literacy 
capable of coping with a new situation brought about by the contingency of digital 
images” (4 – 5). Without literacy training, visual ambiguities will have the potential to 
infect and distort the communication of scientific ideas. For ethical reasons, if nothing 
else, improved visual literacy that pays attention to ambiguity is a necessary step forward 
in scientific communication. 
  The incommensurability between science and communication might be one 
explanation for this hole in scientific visual literacy research; many scientists may simply 
have a lack of interest or understanding in communication practices—where the 
rhetorical, cultural, subjective nature of understanding materializes. But another, more 
likely explanation, might be that the infusion of images, reproductions, and visualization 
technologies in science and culture in the past 30 – 40 years has simply been difficult to 
keep up with. The sudden pervasiveness of animations, videos, photographs, X-rays, 
CAT scans, printouts, advertisements, websites, and digital renderings—not to mention 
the accessibility of digital tools such as Photoshop, AutoCAD, Maya, and Flash and 
advancements in color printing and publication—has made visualizing science so fast and 
easy that scientists have, possibly, inadvertently allowed visualization technologies to 
become prematurely “black boxed.” The imaging of science has, perhaps, developed and 
improved so quickly that scientists have just had to (maybe even begrudgingly) accept it 
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and acquiesce to it.  
 Sherry Turkle describes how scientists that came into the field after 1980 have 
become much more likely to just accept simulation tools as accurate. The glamour, 
dazzling effects, beauty, and high-tech complexity of the machine make technologies 
hard to deny. The fear, then, becomes that “if [aspiring scientists in the classroom 
perform] enough ‘experiments’ in simulation, they [will] become accustomed to looking 
for nature in representations they [do] not fully understand” (40). They will assume 
nature and the visualization of it are no different from each other, creating an eerie 
paradox that Turkle points out: “the virtual [will make] some things seem more real” 
(13). And this problem only exacerbates as technologies become more and more 
powerful. Technologies (microscopes, cameras, software) built to produce high-fidelity 
renderings with sophisticated algorithms and complex computer code are often advanced 
beyond the knowledge of any one user. This makes the visualizations these technologies 
produce easy to simply trust. And in our acceptance and amazement of the wonderful 
image, visual ambiguities are often overlooked. Ironic, perhaps, since ambiguity has been 
the bane of scientific discovery since the 16
th
 century empiricists demanded formality, 
method, and clarity. 
 The visualization of science has been evaluated, as Trumbo remarks, “indirectly” 
from many angles, but little research has been conducted that directly gets at the heart of 
improving visual literacy in scientific communication. More specifically, little if any 
scientific communication research addresses the inescapable presence of ambiguity in 
visuals. Related research in communications studies has addressed the visual “selling of 
 10 
science” through journalism practices (Nelkin Selling Science); the socio-cultural 
influences of popularized scientific images (Hüppauf & Weingart Science Images); and 
the evolution of science perception through writing and imagery (LaFollette Making 
Science Our Own), but none address practical and theoretical applications to dealing with 
ambiguity. Edward Tufte has provided invaluable contributions to the visual displays of 
technical and quantitative information, though his work typically only emphasizes 
readability, which fails to recognize more holistic perceptions of meaning-making (Tufte 
The Visual Display of Quantitative Information). Committees such as the Council of 
Biology Editors have established protocols for printing and publication of images in the 
sciences, but they tend to address, like Tufte, best practices for quality prints, use of 
color, and readability (Anderson Illustrating Science). Works have been produced that 
teach the “art” of illustration in science, though they demonstrate how to practically, 
skillfully draw images “without impressions” and fail to critically address the stylistic 
omissions and inclusions and other ambiguities that affect interpretation (Papp Scientific 
Illustration). Historians have attempted to capture the importance of scientific images 
over the centuries but broadly address the social/historical impact of such images with 
little investigation into the root of the nuances that shape the impact of the image (Ford 
Images of Science). And, of course, copious handbooks on scientific communication have 
been produced that fleetingly mention the inclusion of pictures, graphs, and illustrations, 
though the emphasis has been overwhelmingly focused on the writing (Christensen The 
Hands-On Guide; Laszlo Communicating Science; Montgomery The Chicago Guide; 
Wilson Handbook of Science Communication).  
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 Specific visual design elements that affect meaning making have been, generally 
speaking, ignored by the scientific community. What does the colorization of a cell do to 
its interpretation? How does the juxtaposition of two scientific images inadvertently relay 
a “between the lines reading” of a concept? How does cropping the representation of an 
organism divert attention away from the “big picture”? How do cultural interpretations of 
scientific practices (such as gene modification) redirect attention to specific elements of 
an image? When looking at an image like Barker’s “Osteoperosis,” our gut reaction is to 
accept the rhetorically emotive argument that osteoporosis looks like that! But a more 
visually literate response would be—and what else might it look like? What are the visual 
ambiguities present in this representation that muddy, divert, or concentrate my 
understanding? A lack of engagement in specific visual ambiguities dangerously fails to 
consider important epistemological, pedagogical, and ultimately ethical questions about 
the visual communication of science. The present investigation is one attempt to establish 
a stronger visual literacy in the sciences from a theoretically-driven, praxis oriented 
perspective that exploits visual ambiguities in the imaging and design of science. The 
goal is not to eradicate visual ambiguities in scientific images, but rather to know of their 
influence and presence and how to make productive use of them. 
 
Overcoming the Urge to Eradicate Uncertainty 
In the late 1970s, investigations cropped up that explored the use of visuals in scientific 
communication, particularly in an effort to clarify (for instructive and usability purposes) 
scientific concepts—and essentially remove ambiguity. Scholarship interested in 
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cognition and retention that emerged in the past 50 years attempted to learn how to weed 
out design elements that obscured understanding. This research was useful to evaluate 
student retention for the improvement of textbook design, but it did little to develop a 
broadly useful theory of design that would improve visual literacy. A sampling of this 
research has suggested that text juxtaposed with illustrations improves recall (Mayer 
“Systematic Thinking); that using relevant pictorial information improves cognitive 
processes (Mayer et al. “A Generative Theory”); that “seductive illustrations” impair 
understanding; that fostering “cognitive interest” is better for learning than “emotional 
interest” (Harp & Mayer “The Role of Interest); and that “seductive details…promote 
affective arousal” but do not “lead to better understanding” (Harp & Mayer “How 
Seductive Details”).  
 Such scholarship has suggested that empirical research would be able to 
eventually pinpoint the myriad nuances of design (even artistic representations) and that 
the ambiguity present in scientific representation can be taught to be eradicated—for the 
improvement of learning (following research agendas and protocols that date back to 
Bacon’s, Sprat’s, and the Royal Society’s attempt to formalize scientific language and 
practice). Researchers of design with proclivities toward empiricism have argued that 
visual and informational design principles are universal and stay faithful across languages 
and cultures (see Tufte Envisioning Information); that aesthetics and beauty can be 
codified (see Hassenzal “The Interplay of Beauty”; Norman, Emotional Design; or 
Tractinsky, “Aesthetics and Apparent Usability”); and that grammars and frameworks 
can be established for understanding images (see Krees & van Leeuwen Reading Images; 
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or Bang Picture This). It can be inferred from this work that researchers have often felt 
that ambiguity in visualizations often emerges primarily as a result of the inclusion of 
precise communicative elements (words, shapes, juxtapositions) made by the 
communicators and that, through thoughtful consideration, it can be eliminated. While 
there is certainly usefulness to the findings in this research, broader explorations into the 
complexity of visual communication suggest that ambiguity, to some extent, is always 
present, impossible to completely eradicate. In this light, to better understand the role of 
ambiguity in visual representations of science, it is better to dissect, codify, and evaluate 
ambiguity itself and its components, investigating its presence and influence on a given 
representation, rather than simply evaluating the contents of representations in order to 
(futilely) remove ambiguity.  
 Such a claim does not discredit previous scholarship that has sought clarity 
principles. Clarity-driven research in scientific communication has helped visual 
communicators across disciplines to know how to better approach the practicality and 
expediency of using images to further knowledge. It has helped designers to think 
consciously about what not to do. Such clarity-driven scholarship addresses the human 
need and desire to progress and produce, to understand, control, and frame the entropic 
and abstract universe in which we live in order to make sense out of chaos. At the same 
time, however, this scholarship often fails to address John Dewey’s admonition that we 
cannot ever effectively approach cognition and learning without recognizing that each 
observer, reader, or learner is an individual with dispositions toward certain things and 
that interest and learning is dependent upon a host of factors nearly impossible to 
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quantify.  
 We may interpret from the aforementioned empirical scholarship on 
visualizations that form dictates cognition and that content can be objectified. Ann 
Wysocki, referring to a technically well-designed advertisement displaying a nude 
woman, notes the ethical and affective problem with this theory of cognition. She says as 
form becomes valued, context becomes insignificant, and we fail to realize the 
“consequences of us somehow being shaped by the viewing” (152).  Many visual 
theorists have raised similar issues about affect and interpretation, noting that images and 
visualizations evoke obtuse and subjective meanings (see Elkins, The Object Stares Back; 
or Barthes, “The Third Meaning”) or that images evoke self reflection where identity 
emerges (see Mitchell, Picture Theory; or Barthes, Camera Lucida). This theoretical 
scholarship suggests that ambiguity and subjectivity are impossible to avoid and that 
interpretation, affect, interest, and cognition lie outside the bounds of empiricism yet 
always within the bounds of meaning-making.  
 This theoretical, ontological scholarship is likewise valuable as it addresses the 
ethical and cultural nuances, the socio-political and auto-reflective meanings that affect 
understanding. Such scholarship gives practitioners and educators an opportunity to 
reflect upon the individualistic impact of the usage of visual representations on users and 
learners beyond sheer output, retention, and production. Perhaps ironically, though, this 
more qualitative and theoretical work often is intended to complement empirical research, 
yet it rarely works in tandem with it. Such ontological and theory-driven philosophies are 
often viewed from an objectivist, empirical perspective as interesting thought 
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experiments but rather out of touch with reality. As Eric Eisenberg has recently noted 
(and Donald Levine before him), Western culture has seen a “flight from ambiguity”: 
there has been a fear of chaos caused by a sense of urgency to formalize, methodize, and 
institutionalize the world. The dichotomy that divides the theoretical/ontological from the 
practical/empirical has, I suggest, impaired educators’ and communicators’ ability to 
approach visual literacy from both pragmatic and humanistic perspectives. When we 
demonize and flee from ambiguity, we fail to remember that no representation of science 
can ever be faithfully mimetic. Ambiguity is a part of human communication. And if this 
is the case, then we must first be willing to grapple with ambiguity to improve literacy. 
Unfortunately, this is not an easy task. 
  
The (Rhetorical) Issue of Ambiguity 
Francis Bacon famously declared: “Words plainly force and overrule the understanding, 
and throw all into confusion, and lead men away into numberless empty controversies 
and idle fancies” (Novum Organum section XLIII). Broader than words, of course, what 
Bacon is referring to as the impediment to scientific progress is rhetoric. And, without a 
doubt, rhetoric, deemed an art by Aristotle, has the ability to culpably reframe and 
reconstruct scientific arguments. From certain ethical positions and with a sense of 
urgency to make science efficient, it is no wonder why early empiricists (and eventually 
the Royal Society of London) sought to formalize scientific discourse, establishing 
research protocols and “plain language” practices to distance itself from rhetoric. But as 
most anyone willing to critically examine communication would admit, it is simply not 
 16 
possible to avoid rhetoric when communicating, including in science. And, as it might be 
inferred, ambiguity has a monumentally close relationship with rhetoric. David Blakesley 
has convincingly argued that rhetoric functions as a byproduct of ambiguity, “[exploiting] 
ambiguity to influence people’s attitudes and actions” (9).  Because ambiguity is always 
present in scientific communication, and because this ambiguity rhetorically affects 
human understanding, it becomes a complicated but inescapable part of the visualization 
of science that deserves attention. 
 Of course, what makes this challenging is that Francis Bacon was absolutely 
correct. Communication practices (he referred to words, but we can easily make the 
connection to visuals as well) give frames of reference to ideas but often fall short in 
“truthfully” representing scientific concepts, often “[overruling]…understanding” and 
initiating confusion (XLIII).  Such complicated notions of human understanding have 
made the production of accurate and faithfully mimetic representations of scientific 
phenomena seem a daunting, if not impossible, task.  As Luc Pauwels has noted in Visual 
Cultures of Science, “mimesis without expression is virtually impossible” (3). If 
expression, then, is almost always present, so too is persuasion. And, as Kenneth Burke 
states, “wherever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric. And wherever there is meaning, 
there is persuasion” (Rhetoric of Motives 172).  Where there is expression, persuasion, 
and rhetoric, we might also suggest that there is “uncertainty.” This iterative rhetorical-
ambiguous issue of communication festers at the root of visual literacy conundrums in 
science. 
 In the instruction, visual replication, and communication of scientific phenomena, 
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there is, undoubtedly, polarizing schisms in the way science is taught and demonstrated. 
The abstract concept of affect, the human element of emotion, and the complex multi-
sensorial and extra-sensorial (dreams, imagination, spirituality) components of human 
experience and cognition often encumber scientists’, educators’, and communicators’ 
ability to effectively integrate quantitative and qualitative approaches to understanding 
cognition, retention, and overall experience and understanding. The challenges arise as 
we try to tackle such complicated topics as the “subjective [processes] of interpretation 
and a social construction of models” (see Katz 6); “tacit knowledge” (see Polanyi 30 – 
31); a learner’s “disposition” towards a topic (see Dewey 7 – 10); and the “oppression” 
that comes from societal, educational, and linguistic apparatuses (as argued by Paulo 
Freire), among other complex matters. 
 Ambiguity—both in language and in visual representation—propels rhetorical 
motives. Because rhetoric is both visual and linguistic (as well as aural and gestural, 
which I will not be addressing), there is obvious overlap in the discussions about 
ambiguity in scientific representation as language and as visual. When scientists 
communicate research and findings, the definitions and descriptions of substances (of 
ideas, people, places, contexts, etc.) are at the mercy of ambiguity’s influence. And 
because scientific communication is an attempt to persuade or argue for results, findings, 
and phenomena, rhetoric becomes necessary artillery for scientific communicators to 
battle with the ambiguity. Blakesley has suggested that rhetoric is necessary only when 
there might be place for a counterargument (9). Counterarguments —and thus 
ambiguities—are possible in just about any scientific communication; thus exploitation 
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(whether thoughtful, careless, or unknowing) of ambiguity is a regular function of 
scientific representation. This is, perhaps, why one might say that dialectical 
argumentation in the sciences, which is reliant on the concept of endoxa (opinions held 
by the majority of people or by the educated), is faulty.  Rhetorical argumentation in the 
sciences—which constantly works through and exploits ambiguity—is a much more 
reasonable perspective.  
 
Embracing Ambiguity 
Traditional empiricists and positivistic thinkers in the sciences, however, are not likely to 
readily jump on board the ambiguity bandwagon. Aristotle, Francis Bacon, John Locke, 
Charles Darwin, and many others, after all, established useful and productive taxonomies 
and methods that purportedly drove science away from ambiguity and into precision. If 
we believe, as these empiricists did, that the attempt to eliminate ambiguity is necessary, 
there is no need for rhetoric in scientific discourse. This does not mean that scientific 
research is fruitless, or rhetoric asinine; indeed, the attempts to remove ambiguity and 
rhetoric through scientific method have led to the establishment of important frameworks 
for highly successful cognitive and physical production of scientific knowledge, 
knowledge borne from empirical-analytical and mathematical-logical dimensions of 
science, as Gerald Holton suggested (46). 
 But ambiguity in science, we might say, emerges from Hume’s take on 
empiricism: while sensorial experience is at the root of objective science, thoughts and 
ideas are built out of a principle of copying and reflecting (possibly without end) what 
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our senses and emotions experience. There is always some uncertainty between the way 
we understand and germinate ideas about our sensorial experience with scientific 
phenomena (14 – 15). This is especially apparent with causality—one of the central 
problems Hume grappled with: we never see causality, only a series of effects. With 
Hume’s perspective in mind, it becomes clear that the inability to recognize ambiguity as 
a prevalent part of science reflects a central principle about how knowledge is 
constructed in the sciences, and thus brings that process closer to the understanding of 
creativity and knowledge in the arts and humanities. Overlooking ambiguity, plain and 
simple, hinders improved visual literacy. 
 If language and visuals could be “plain,” unnuanced, and free of multiplicities of 
meaning, ambiguity might very well be eradicated. But a brief survey of the nature of 
understanding (as a byproduct of both visual and linguistic communication) strongly 
suggests that knowledge is rarely certain and that ambiguity is, in fact, a pervasive part of 
meaning-making that we must learn to embrace. Empiricists and ontologists alike, after 
all, have indicated that our senses deceive us—nothing is precisely as it seems. Further, 
we may note from the works of Lakoff & Johnson or Richard Boyd that language is 
metaphorical in nature, wrought with undertones, puns, allegories, and that we 
understand the world not through what is commonly known as “plain language” but 
through metaphorical connections. Boyd and others like Joachim Schummer in “Gestalt 
Switch in Molecular Perception” even suggest that scientific knowledge is “rich in 
anthropomorphisms” (Schummer 61) and created through “theory-constitutive 
metaphors.” (Boyd 373).  Jean Baudrillard, Mark Taylor, and Walter Benjamin—to name 
 20 
a few—have demonstrated the multiplicity of meanings existent as a result of mechanical 
reproduction. Baudrillard argues that nearly everything becomes a replica or copy 
(Simulacra and Simulation); Taylor suggests that there is no end to pictorial rhetoric 
(pictures within pictures) in art and imagery (The Picture in Question); and Benjamin 
claims that art and images lose their aura in the process of reproduction (“The Work of 
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”). Further yet, the nuances of culture 
emerges in every photo (see Barthes, “The Photographic Message”); values affect, more 
than anything else, human understanding (see Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason); and 
knowledge is not created autonomously, but through social systems and apparatuses (see 
Agamben’s “What is an Apparatus?”), where bureaucracy, politics, discussions, and 
values infiltrate knowledge-making (see Latour, Science in Action). Gerald Holton has 
noted that in addition to the traditional experimental-analytical model of creating 
scientific knowledge—which he labels as the x-y axis—there is a z-axis that must include 
imagination, dreams, spirituality, and other less quantifiable understandings. Elizabeth 
Parthenea Shea has also demonstrated that in the construction of facts, histories and 
narrations change the course of understanding (How the Gene Got Its Groove). Further 
still, the technologies that produce visualizations, or that calculate algorithms, become 
and remain “black-boxed” (Latour, Science in Action) only until anomalies are 
discovered outside of the predominant paradigm (Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions).   
 This brief survey is not, by any means, exhaustive, but serves simply to suggest 
that ambiguity is a ubiquitous component of human understanding and scientific 
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knowledge. If we are to understand visual literacy in the sciences, we must recognize that 
in the creation and communication of knowledge, ambiguity is not extinguishable, but 
rather that it exists in many forms and in many degrees. Ambiguity is complex and 
ambiguous, but the ability to dissect and investigate it by its many components—even if 
it is not possible to entirely dissect or discover every component—will significantly 
improve our understanding of how it affects communication and understanding. 
  By embracing ambiguity, we can understand it and effectively employ it. And, by 
doing so, we will open up channels for theoreticians and empiricists alike where both 
rhetorical affect and cognitive ‘output’ are considered. In the end, an embracement of 
ambiguity in science communication should provide a catalyst into improved visual 
literacy in the sciences and, thus, strengthened ethical awareness about how what is 
communicated ambiguously transfers into what is known about reality. 
 The remainder of this dissertation follows a path for discovering how visual 
ambiguity might function as an epistemological bridge between the art and science of 
scientific communication in order to, in a practical sense, improve visual literacy. The 
chapters that follow do not comprise an in-depth philosophical endeavor to expose 
ambiguity as an ontological device that reframes the way science, as it exists in the 
human mind, is constructed. While there is value, no doubt, in that conversation (and 
some of it is adhered to here), the scope of this work is to more practically, through 
investigation of how ambiguity works, expose how visual ambiguities can be researched 
and adapted more readily into scientific communication discourse.  
 As such, Chapter 2 investigates what visual ambiguity might be said to consist of, 
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and works through the challenges of paradoxically reigning in ambiguity enough to 
expose where and how it exists in visual representations. Chapter 3 explores how we 
might further codify visual ambiguity—for the purposes of inserting it into scientific 
communication and visual literacy discourse—by applying theoretical perspectives on 
taxonomy. Chapter 4 shows the construction of a Taxonomic Wheel of Visual Ambiguity 
and further develops a heuristic, a Tetradic Model of Visual Ambiguity, whereby 
scientific communicators may rhetorically analyze visual representations of science. 
Chapter 5 then demonstrates the application of the Tetradic Model on Norman Barker’s 
“Osteoporosis” as an example of how we might rhetorically and empirically analyze the 
role of visual ambiguity in the meaning making process. In conclusion, Chapter 6 
addresses the limitations of this theory and Tetradic Model of Visual Ambiguity as we 
look to further research in visual literacy in the sciences. 
 23 
CHAPTER TWO 




“One way of considering the invention of modern science is as a transformation 
 of our way of looking.” 
-Francesco Panese, “The Accursed Part of Scientific Iconography” 
 
 
Allusions to the inescapability of visual ambiguities in most or all representations of 
science were made in the opening chapter. Such references may be considered audacious, 
perhaps even brash, to those who seek clarity and precision in scientific communication. 
The goal of a claim about ambiguity’s presence, however, is not to subvert or disavow 
the importance of clear communication. Rather, such a claim seeks simply to enrich and 
peer deeper into what “clear” communication might actually mean. Admittedly, though, 
embracing ambiguity as a viable approach to improved visual literacy in the sciences 
does require a change in perspective from traditional clarity-driven approaches. It 
requires an acceptance of ambiguity’s influence (perhaps even fundamental influence) in 
the way meaning is made. If ambiguity is not pervasive in scientific communication, then 
it is likely eradicable, and there would be little reason to pursue ambiguity further. If, 
however, ambiguity is inevitably attached to scientific thought and communication, 
scientific communicators ought better to understand how, where, and to what extent. 
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With this in mind, the present chapter operationally explores the ubiquity of visual 
ambiguity by reviewing perspectives on visual communication from a number of 
disciplines.  
 
The Paradox: Clarifying Ambiguity 
Paradoxically, then, this chapter seeks to first clarify ambiguity by attempting to 
distinguish its characteristics, origins, and effects on meaning-making. Indeed, such an 
attempt may sound like a deeply philosophical endeavor that may provide more questions 
than solutions. To those who wish to glean a practical toolkit for designing with/without 
ambiguity, it might sound like fruitless wishful thinking. After all, ambiguity is 
ambiguous. Doesn’t clarifying ambiguity essentially kill it? And is that not what science 
has been trying to do all along—clarify and eradicate? If ambiguity is inescapable, can it 
really be made clear? Why, then, even attempt to “clarify” ambiguity? William Empson, 
after all, in his famous treatise on the 7 Types of Ambiguity suggested attempted 
delineation of ambiguity might only create more questions than solutions: 
‘Ambiguity’ itself can mean an indecision as to what you mean, an intention to 
mean several things, a probability that one or other or both of two things has been 
meant, and the fact that a statement has several meanings. It is useful to be able to 
separate these if you wish, but it is not obvious in separating them at any 
particular point you will not be raising more problems than you solve. (6) 
If delineating components of ambiguity might only raise more questions and problems 
about the presence of ambiguity in visual representations of science, is there even a 
 25 
point? To this, I would simply but emphatically say, yes! 
 Literacy, as we well know, does not solve the world’s problems, not even 
communicative ones. It does, however, germinate awareness of the problems’ roots and 
reaches. An attempt at visual literacy that embraces ambiguity acknowledges the nuanced 
communicative means that inevitably alter meaning. Clearly, the concept “clarifying 
ambiguity” is a blatant oxymoron. But if nature is to be viewed as the vast and boundless 
fountain of untapped knowledge and science is the device used to tap into and codify that 
knowledge, then the idea of science itself is likewise paradoxical. On the one side we 
believe that the task of knowing everything is beyond the capability of man. On the other, 
we believe that at least if we attempt it, we will know more than we did before. Any 
attempt to clarify visual ambigiuity, as Empson attempted with literary ambiguity, ought 
not be considered the only approach, but one of several that provides insight—helps us 
know more than we did before. The attempt in this chapter to clarify visual ambiguity 
serves not as the authoritative review that dictates all of visual literacy in science. Rather, 
it is a working codification of how human nature and nature itself have worked together 
and at odds with each other in order to better understand the communicative effects of 
visual representations. 
 To clarify how ambiguity functions in scientific communication, science must be 
viewed, at least in part, as socially constructed. Effective visual literacy in the sciences 
embraces the idea that histories and societies, indeed even the histories of institutions and 
their socio-cultural underpinnings, shapes the very way in which knowledge is perceived 
and gained. Blind acceptance of scientific method (and, particularly, images produced 
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with that method) as knowledge naively fails to consider that science as we know it is 
restrained and formulated by economic, political, moral, and technological conditions 
that have evolved and shape-shifted in time. Despite the controversy over his work, a 
scientist wishing to embrace ambiguity as an integral component to improved visual 
literacy must accept Bruno Latour’s admonitions about science as a humanistic endeavor: 
that it is always “in action.” Science as we know it is a construction of facts through 
complicated decision-making processes that mold the formation of a scientific theory or 
experiment. While it is convenient and often politically correct (in many scientific 
circles) to claim that science is simply based on strict method, rationality, and procedure 
and that is all that matters, true visual literacy in the sciences recognizes that the 
visualizations juxtaposed with a scientific argument have been produced throughout a 
timeline of actions and decisions much less “scientific.” Latour states: 
Some scientists talk about science, its ways and means, but few of them accept the 
discipline of becoming also an outsider; what they say about their trade is hard to 
double check in the absence of independent scrutiny. Other people talk about 
science, its solidity, its foundation, its development or its dangers; unfortunately, 
almost none of them are interested in science in the making. They shy away from 
the disorderly mixture revealed by science in action and prefer the orderly pattern 
of scientific method and rationality. (15) 
Science is, in reality, a social endeavor, informed by men of antiquity where the 
conversation contemporarily spills into journals, media, universities, laboratories, 
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politics, board rooms, and marketable products. The images that are produced for 
scientific purposes do not magically appear, without context—they are the derivative of 
thoughtful (and sometimes painful) processes that involve technologies and technological 
know-how, finances, politics, publication restraints, and so forth.  
 After all, what we know to be scientifically “true” is only so until new knowledge, 
epiphanies, or “anomalies” make people think about reality in a new way, when they 
break away from what Kuhn has noted as the accepted paradigm (The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions). An image that might stand as representative of osteoporosis today 
could by tomorrow exhibit a new nuance that will be rejected by the osteology 
community. New knowledge is always lurking at the crux of ambiguity circumnavigating 
a scientific thought. What we perceive to be accurate in a visual representation of science 
has been “black-boxed” by the authority of the scientist, journal, or organization who 
published it. In other words, if we view a scientific representation published by someone 
or some entity of credibility in the field, it is easy for us to disregard any present 
ambiguities created in the history behind its production. We naively make direct 
correlation between the image and the real world. 
 But I do not use the term ‘naively’ in contempt or as an insult. Human nature 
somehow leads us to accept that “seeing is believing.” It is our imperative, then, to 
unlearn what we see as clear and expose and exploit what ambiguities are hiding behind 
the rocks. 
 I am not the first to address this; certainly there is recognition that ambiguity 
affects understanding. However, a common contemporary method for improving our 
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understanding of ambiguity in science and instruction has been to understand how 
ambiguity infects communication, rather than how it more broadly affects 
communication. This method has been used to discover concepts that disrupt 
communication and learning. Researchers in instructional communication, for example, 
have attempted since the 1970s to understand how clarity can improve learning retention 
in scientific instruction. To do so, they have assigned concepts related to ambiguity such 
as “vagueness terms” (Land); “discontinuity” (Smith & Cotten); “seductive details” 
(Harp & Mayer); and “affect cues” (Titsworth). Terminologies like these have provided 
productive points of reference for those creating particular documents. Textbook 
designers, for example, have been able to learn from this scholarship that certain types of 
images and stories about images (like a person being struck by lightning in a chapter on 
meteorology) have the ability to “distract,” “disrupt,” and “divert” attention from the 
concepts intended to be taught (Harp & Mayer 1998). Hence these ambiguous elements 
are encouraged to be left out of certain communications. What is left out of this research, 
of course, are the places where ambiguity is inescapable. Or, where it is actually useful. 
  Chapter 4 references this kind of scholarship, though in a different light, 
particularly focused on the broader effects of ambiguity. Using terminology to categorize, 
a taxonomy is established in order to demarcate useful terms associated with visual 
ambiguity. However, it is clear that stronger literacy in visual communication stems from 
a more thorough investigation that looks beyond the formal elements (design, 
colorization, cropping, and so forth) of scientific images. Ambiguity materializes in 
visual communication of the sciences as a result of a host factors beyond just the details 
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of design and imagery. Societies, histories, rhetoric, and human disposition play a much 
more fundamental role in the way visual representations are understood than the more 
streamlined and perfunctory ambiguous visual elements might.  This chapter establishes a 
“landscape” of visual ambiguity, a socio-historical, rhetorical, technological, and 
metaphysical approach to the presences of ambiguity in scientific communication. Here, I 
address a foundational review of how ambiguity makes its presence in scientific 
communication and thought. 
  
Socio-Cultural Histories of Visual Ambiguity in Scientific Communication 
To begin with, a review of the societal and organizational influence over visualization 
practices follows. A society’s social and cultural value system has incredible influence on 
the way that science is practiced, communicated, and accepted. Societies in history have 
altered the direction of science as they determined what was valued and what belonged in 
certain social and political circles. As Paul Feyberabend has indicated: “Even efficient 
knowledge may be rejected because of the way its acquisition disturbs important social 
values” (29). And further: “Values affect not only the application of knowledge, but are 
essential ingredients of knowledge itself” (28). An exploration into visual literacy in 
science must evaluate the social histories that have shaped the way science has been and 
continues to be visually represented. Much has been documented in regards to the 
histories of visual communication in science (see Brian Ford’s Images of Science; Lynch 
& Woolgar’s Representation in Scientific Practice; Brian Vickery’s Science 
Communication in History; or Peter Achinstein’s Scientific Rules as a starting point) thus 
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this section makes no attempt to capture an entire history of scientific communication. 
Rather, it summarizes perspectives about the socio-cultural role in forging milieus of 
ambiguity in scientific representation. 
 The production and acceptance of scientific visualizations has had a unique 
historical background that has wrestled with socio-cultural influences of art and 
imagination in contrast to science since man walked the earth. In the present dissertation, 
the subject is approached in the same manner that Judith Wechsler has done, claiming 
that with art and science, “there is no a priori essential epistemological way of seeing” 
and that “aesthetics [are]… a mode of cognition which focuses on forms and metaphors 
used in scientific conceptualizing and modeling” (6). Because ambiguity often finds itself 
positioned within the locus between artistic expression and objective reason, improved 
visual literacy must include recognizing the historical divisions between art and science. 
Scientific movements (or paradigms) in history have swayed in and out of acceptance of 
expressionist art and meaning making, therefore, has been reliant upon both aesthetics 
and reason, though the focus has shifted in different cultures and time periods. Improved 
visual literacy in the science, thus, means apprehending that histories of scientific 
representations have experienced varied cultural acceptance of certain kinds of images 
for certain purposes and at different times, sometimes favoring aesthetics, other times 
favoring methods. In Western culture, we must recognize that for centuries, emphasis has 
been placed on methods, marginalizing aesthetics in epistemological debates. In other 
words, societies and cultures have been the dictators of what is accurate, oft times 
disjointing science’s and art’s epistemological imbrications. Ambiguity, it might be 
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inferred, frequently finds itself where the clarity of science is interrupted by the influence 
of aesthetics, and, by association, the values, bureaucracies, and social systems that play 
within that bifurcation.   
 While some have claimed that the oldest of cave paintings are the beginnings of 
art, Ford emphatically suggests that, because of their obvious instructive and 
diagrammatical nature, “these images were not art, but science” (7). According to Ford’s 
perspective, art came later with the development of weaving and pottery and the images 
of prey and war eventually turned to images of decoration. But it might easily be argued 
that there has always been a great overlap between the two. Expression, after all, is 
imaginative and for millennia humans were reliant upon the imagination to visually 
depict phenomena they were trying to understand. This becomes clear as we reflect on 
Galen’s work around A D 200, where he imagined the inner workings of the human body 
without ever dissecting one (although he dissected animals.) Interestingly, though, during 
what Westerners often consider the birth of scientific thought at the time of Plato and 
Aristotle, there seems to be little attempt to visually represent science. Aristotle classified 
plants and animals verbally and textually (which led to encyclopedic compilations of 
nature by Lucretius and Pliny the Elder), but attempts to do so visually in a scientific way 
came much later (Ford 17, 31). 
  Seventeenth century science and those associated with the development of what 
we now call the Scientific Revolution made it a priority to separate artistic visuals from 
those scientific. Objectivity became an ideology that eventually polarized the two 
domains. Hüppart and Weingart note that 17
th
 century illustrations of science tended to 
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include works that could be seen as aesthetic works of art and scientific collections at the 
same time (making reference to Joan Blaeu’s Atlas Major and Albertus Seba’s 
Thesaurus). However, Hüppart and Weingart further note that while acceptance of these 
works was given in important scientific circles, the illustrations had to be representative 
and justifiable to popular narratives of the time. As Da Vinci, Newton, Descartes, and 
others that initiated important strides in scientific development produced scientific works, 
new standards were being built for what could be defined as truth and objectivity. 
Eventually, they Hüppart and Weingart continue, “a separation of aesthetic values from 
the information value” emerged (7). Visually representing science became a practice not 
of imagination and exploration, but a way of visually copying what scientific research 
had already discovered. The introduction of photography into science continued this 
tradition (and still does, in many ways, today). Illustrations and photographs quickly 
became ancillary devices that were helpful to inform, but did not produce the knowledge. 
Hence, aesthetics have been, for the most part, ignored (8).  
 Ford’s extensive collection of images in his History of Scientific Illustration tells 
a similar story. While images of science persisted through the middle ages (Ford depicts a 
13
th
 century English diagram of the nervous system and an Arabic portrayal of the human 
eye around 1000 AD, among others), the domains of aesthetics and art for decorative 
purposes—rather than for science and medicine—tended to dominate the production of 
visuals for centuries. As the Scientific Revolution gave rise, the imaging of science 
resurfaced as an integral part of scientific thought. The convergence of art and science in 
visual representation during this time created a hotbed of controversy over what should 
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be accepted as scientific and what should not. Depictions of science such as Jean 
Bauhin’s Historia Plantarum Universalis and the Physica Curiosa by Caspar Schott—
despite their meticulous attempts to understand nature and inexplicable phenomena 
through visual representation—were discarded by the Royale Society because of their 
connections to religion, mythology, and curiosities. Scientific images that attempted to 
mix folk knowledge with empirical knowledge were simply considered idealized, much 
like our science fiction images might be today (Panese). 
 Francesco Panese describes the events of the 17
th
 century focus on empirical, 
objective representations as a direct byproduct of the Baconian proposition to archive 
nature as accurately as possible—which quickly included the visual cataloging of known 
species of plants and animals. What initially emerged were narrative compilations that 
integrated ideological understandings of nature with scientific ones, where illustrations 
demonstrated a “visual and ideological synthesis of a system of knowledge in which 
things seen and things said are linked to one another” (64). According to Panese, religion, 
politics, ideologies, as well as descriptions of plants all initially found their way into the 
account of nature. Bauhin’s Historia Plantarum Universalis, an attempt to create a 
universal botany through depictions of plants, narrates a story beyond inclusion of strict 
scientific method as we know it. Historia, rather, infiltrated conversations with and 
images of classical Greek authorities and philosophers and God himself. The production 
of knowledge from works like these established broader understandings of science as 
they were perceived by human curiosities. Blaes’ Anatomie Animalium—a similar 
endeavor in scope (to describe animal species) but very different in communicative 
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approach—on the other hand, represented nature not through dialogue of the ancients or 
by giving a socio-cultural history, but by simply giving wordy descriptions of images. 
Consider what Panese says demonstrates the way modern science views nature similar to 
Blaes’ method as opposed to the way Bauhin depicted it: 
[In the Anatomie Animalium] we no longer find any trace of the ancients at all, 
nor of time, nor history. In an open space, the lantern of Reason, armed with a 
magnifying glass and a scalpel, unveils a bountiful Nature around whom presses a 
docile crowd of animals. The entrails of these are displayed for us by two 
innocent cherubs. The right-hand angel rolls them out like a portraitist across a 
canvas, where they acquire a new visibility. He holds his scalpel—or his lancet—
as we would a pen to fix the form of an organ on paper. This allegory of the world 
in writing deploys an idealized knowledge in which description immediately 
adheres to the real without recourse to any other register. (64) 
 
Panese suggests that in Blaes’ work, although still very different from the way science is 
often portrayed today, there is something very similar to the way science is 
contemporarily represented: “wordy descriptions that adhere to the visible without 
recourse to the commentaries of preceding observers or commentators. Its descriptions 
are ordered in classes, within which species are listed in alphabetical order. The 
image…is inseparable from the text” (67). Acceptance of Blaes’ approach over those 
similar to Bauhin’s by those in the appropriate social ranks eventually led to images 
published in scientific journals without reference to God, ideology, politics, and so forth. 
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What was seen was supposed to represent precisely what it depicted. The visual referent, 
in other words, was to be considered a faithful simulacrum of the real thing and 
aesthetics, once again, was set aside. 
 Other visualizations that made direct connections to nature as it could be 
practically observed and experimented upon—images of insects, machines, anatomical 
formations, and plant life—were given the thumbs-up for educational use and were 
filtered into classrooms as wall charts and textbooks. And it appears that, as long as a 
visual gave the appearance of scientific and empirical rigidity (that it did not attempt to 
address the metaphysical world or obscure, inexplicable deformities of nature), it was 
given clearance. Panese writes: “From the experimentalists’ perspective, curiosities were 
not…worthy of consideration unless it was possible to fix them somewhere within the 
regularly ordered system of nature” (80). This system of nature somehow did not seem to 
include aesthetic consideration. Hence, what was produced in relation to the sciences in 
the 19
th
 century was much more diagrammatical, the intention being to supplement the 
science, but without regards to its influence on the science. Under this mindset, a sudden 
surge of scientific images were used to communicate anything from “Greek and Roman 
war machines,” to “[processes] of beer production,” to “health and hygiene” campaigns 
(Bucchi 91 – 93). Within a short period of time, scientific images transformed from 
“capturing” and “cataloging” nature, to teaching and disseminating it, without much 
reflection into aesthetics, histories, and cultures.  
 As the 20
th
 century approached and as printing and publication technologies 
improved, mass production of scientific images became a norm, although always under 
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the guise of objectivity. Despite the socio-political processes for creating and 
disseminating images, visual representations just became the ancillary component of 
science and they were simply expected to faithfully mimic the rigorous research that 
informed them. Mark Tansey has suggested that “in a world increasingly driven by 
advertising and governed by televisual technologies and computer networks, things 
become images and images become real” (20). Scientific illustrators were hired to 
observe and replicate and it was just assumed (as it often is today) that the images are a 
product of truth, a simply re-mediated version of the science experiment, phenomenon, 
and writing. What becomes ambiguous is when we investigate the production cycle of the 
image and the organizations that oversee its dissemination and the aesthetics that exist 
but are not attended to. What a society chooses to value greatly changes what is both 
represented and “seen.” In Western culture, this often means that aesthetics are devalued 
or disregarded in appraisal of the scientific method. 
 Perhaps one of the most widely used scientific textbooks in human history is 
Henry Gray’s Anatomy. In 2008, the 40
th
 edition of the book was published and is still 
circulated and used by medical students today, nearly 150 years after its first publication. 
In 750 pages, with over 350 meticulously drawn illustrations, this book has become 
known as a staple for understanding the human body. Ford suggests that such a book was 
the product of an evolution in scientific communication. While images have been 
purportedly used for scientific (rather than artistic) purposes since the earliest known 
man, their use, function, and acceptance has varied widely throughout the annals of time. 
Gray was a Fellow of the Royal Society (elected at the young age of 25), a good 
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indication that his publications and the illustrations within them were widely accepted by 
the scientific community of his time. But illustrators and scientists over the millennia 
have not been similarly praised for their attempts to visually document nature and 
scientific phenomena.  
 Science, as a function within a culture, is reliant upon the values systems of 
governments, institutions, and religions—established by small and large groups of people 
with divergent perspectives. This might be best clearly explained by referring to Ford’s 
example of Arab scientist Avicenna (Abu ‘Ali al-Husain ibn Abdallah ib Sina at Ashana, 
his birth name) who used others’ descriptions of medical science because he was 
forbidden to dissect a human body himself, as it was outlawed in the Qur’an (34 -35). 
The communication of science is heavily contingent upon societal apparatuses that 
dictate the processes for developing and disseminating research and observations. Our 
present day Institutional Review Board (IRB) and the Health and Science 
Communications Association (HeSCA) are examples of the protocols and communities 
with which scientists have to adhere. Modern-day imaging of science comes with 
newfound challenges that might superficially seem to present more potential for visual 
ambiguity than in the past. Sixteenth century sketches of da Vinci’s complicated 
machines and biological formations, for example, did not have to deal with the same kind 
of print publication pressures that scientists today do. Nor did Da Vinci develop his 
Embryo in the Womb drawing, for example, with color printing, design software, 
publication, and global distribution in mind. Today’s visualizations are often created and 
published with myriad sophisticated visual/digital editing techniques coupled with a 
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necessity to connect to theory, practice, and cultural acceptance that scientific 
communications of the past were not. Yet all visuals in the sciences, past and present, 
have dealt with socio-cultural, ambiguous nuances that affect meaning. Histories and 
societies become part of the ambiguous display in the scientific visual.  
 Current acceptance of the image’s non-aesthetic role in the sciences has come in 
large part because of this history. But as technologies move us into an era where a very 
artistic rendering of cells is being used for instruction in Harvard medical schools, it’s 
time to rethink the ambiguities that are lost or disregarded because of social, historical 
value systems in the sciences.  
 Linguistic-Rhetorical Ambiguity in Visual Representation 
Ambiguity is not present, however, simply because the histories and societies that 
produced an image are unclear or mistaken. We might be well aware of the socio-cultural 
history surrounding the production of an image. Certainly, reduction of historical, socio-
cultural ambiguity is feasible as a scientist or observer becomes aware of the social and 
historical circumstances that led to its production and acceptance. A much more difficult 
kind of ambiguity to work with is linguistic-rhetorical ambiguity.  
 Francis Bacon’s disdain for rhetoric is evident from his statements in the Novum 
Organum. But he, an empiricist, shares a very similar view on language as Noam 
Chomsky, a linguist: words are too “pliable” to be fixed by definitions (Bacon LX; 
Montgomery x). There is no escaping a word’s ability to alter or affect meaning. The 
difference between Bacon and Chomsky, perhaps, is that Bacon hoped to somehow reign 
in the rhetoric. Undoubtedly, the methods he and others produced did well to 
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productively serve empiricist guidelines for scientific communication. Whether linguistic 
or visual, though, many scientists of the past have followed Bacon’s perspective, trying to 
resist the notion that rhetoric is a part of their communication. After all, rhetoric and 
ambiguity often become synonymous and they, from many scientists’ perspective, hinder 
scientific development. But as Randy Allen Harris has argued rhetoric (and by 
association, ambiguity) is not an impediment to science—rather it is what allows progress 
by working through incommensurable perspectives in scientific communities (91 – 98). 
 It is true that rhetoric’s inescapable relationship with science is becoming more 
and more familiar, though it is not yet accepted as a part of mainstream science. Latour, 
Feyerabend, and Kuhn, all renowned philosophers of science, have raised awareness of 
the subjectivity of scientific practice and the role that language, rhetoric, and values play 
in the development of scientific discourse and argument. Stephen Toulmin, a philosopher 
of reasoning, has likewise made important contributions to the way we understand 
argumentation in the sciences. Of particular note, Toulmin has emphasized how modal 
qualifiers, rebuttals, claims, and grounds are just as influential in daily conversation as 
they are in published scientific articles. And contemporary textbooks and handbooks 
geared towards scientific communication repeatedly emphasize that subtle nuances in 
language have great impact on interpretation of scientific knowledge (see Penrose & 
Katz’s Writing in the Sciences or Russel’s Communicating Science, for example). The 
Chicago Guide to Communicating Science, a book written in 2003 entirely for scientists, 
actually states “the flow of science, in form and articulation, has always been diverse, 
offering reasons for writers and speakers to both adapt and explore” (Montgomery x). 
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This same book also devotes an entire chapter to “creativity and elegance.” The term 
“rhetoric,” however, is almost entirely removed from these latter works. 
 A growing perspective, however, in the past decade or two has been a tacit 
awareness and acceptance of the role that rhetoric and language plays in scientific 
discourse. Chemistry Nobel Prize winner Roald Hoffmann, for example, has claimed that 
the publication of scientific information and research is wrought with ambiguous, 
rhetorical nuances (though his phrasing is different) that we often do not consider in 
relation to scientific method. On the publication of scientific articles in academic 
journals, he says: 
Much more goes on in that article than one imagines at first sight; that what goes 
on is a kind of dialectical struggle between what a chemist imagines should be 
said (the paradigm, the normative) and what he or she must say to convince others 
of his argument or achievement. That struggle endows the most innocent-looking 
article with a lot of suppressed tension. To reveal that tension is…not at all a sign 
of weakness or irrationality, but a recognition of the deep humanity of the creative 
act in science. (57). 
Even still, despite the intermittent acquiescence to rhetoric in the sciences, rhetoric is not 
a widely praised area of discussion in scientific circles. “Rhetoric is a fascinating albeit 
despised discipline,” Latour states (30). Harris has suggested that this is a longstanding 
perspective that dates back to Cicero, when rhetoric increasingly became associated “with 
aesthetics at the expense of argumentation.” Harris further sheds light on this: “with the 
rise of scientific rationalism and the empiricist craze of the early modern period, aesthetic 
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elements of discourse came to be seen as worse than merely pretty; they came to be seen 
as misleading, corrosive to truth and knowledge” (14 – 15). But the rhetorical means that 
human beings have to communicate information necessarily create ambiguous 
relationships between the scientific experiment and the communication of it. Whether or 
not it is accepted as a viable component to scientific discourse, it certainly has powerful 
effects on communication.  
 It is worth noting here Kenneth Burke’s take on John Locke’s description of 
substance. Science, by default, must have a subject matter. That subject matter, upon 
which a scientist bases his argumentation and experimentation, is defined and explicated 
in terms and in visuals. This “substance” is, for the scientist, his greatest strength of 
credibility. After all, Burke notes that, in his dramatistic method, substance is a scenic 
word—it is affected by the situation in which it is described. If the substance of a 
scientific report (argument) is accepted by the community for which it is written, the 
scientist has succeeded in moving that strand of research forward. What complicates this 
is that substance can never be fully understood by using words. Our communicative 
methods as human beings are limited by “antinomies of definition” and “[paradoxes] of 
substance” (Grammar 21). John Locke, describing the infinitude of description (using the 
example of an Indian man who says that the earth is supported by a great elephant, which, 
when asked, is supported by a tortoise, and so forth), suggests that “in all…cases where 
we use words without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk like children.” Eventually, 
he says, we often have no response when asked deep enough about the substance of a 
thing or idea other than, “it is something” (qtd. in Burke 22). 
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 Burke suggests that to get at the root of the substance of some thing or idea, we 
are reliant upon defining it in terms of something that it is not. We try to mark boundaries 
around an idea by using terms that “possess…contextual reference” (24). Thus, there is 
an “inevitable paradox of definition, an antinomy that must endow the concept of 
substance with unresolvable [sic] ambiguity” (24).  Rhetoric from this perspective is 
necessary artillery for scientists—whether they like it or not—to work within 
communicative systems. And, regardless, communicative ambiguities will persist. What 
the scientist is required to do, then, is to establish the parameters (“circumference”) of his 
or her scientific argument. “For we take [the scientist’s experiment] to indicate,” Burke 
suggests, “with the utmost clarity possible, the terministic relationship between the 
circumscription and the circumscribed. For no matter how much a matter of purely 
empirical observation it may seem to be, it actually is a very distinct choice of 
circumference for the placement of human motives” (78). In other words, we might ask: 
are the action(s) that the scientist is motivated to perform within the scope of the entire 
scientific community, or will he/she be trying to persuade only a small group of 
colleagues at a local research forum? And how will the communicative choices—the 
words, tones, and images shift as a result of this circumference? What is implied here is 
that ambiguity fluctuates within different circumferences, that it is always present, and 
that rhetoric is both a causer of—and a tool for working with—ambiguity. 
 What Burke discusses is primarily focused on the linguistic function of rhetoric as 
it is related to human action and understanding. But I would argue that these ambiguities 
present in linguistic argumentations in science are equally (though differently) present in 
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visuals.  
 We might consider the work of Richard Boyd to make this transition between the 
rhetoric of linguistic ambiguities and that of visual ambiguities. In his article “Metaphor 
and Theory Change,” Boyd convincingly suggests that scientific theories are frequently 
built upon visual metaphors. Metaphors that scientists can mentally envision (examples 
he gives include electron clouds, worm-holes, or atoms as miniature solar systems) 
become part and parcel of the way the science is communicated and understood. And 
because “the establishment of a fundamental new theoretical perspective is a matter of 
persuasion, recruitment, and indoctrination,” visual metaphors rhetorically alter 
perception (359). Like within Burke’s antinomies of definition in linguist rhetoric, 
ambiguity infiltrates science as a result of visual metaphors in other but similar ways. 
Visual ambiguities crop up where there are gaps between the metaphor and its 
relationship to the scientific phenomenon; where one metaphor might be equally 
substituted by another metaphor to describe the same thing; or where the metaphor might 
make a loose connection between the theory and the real thing. Perhaps ambiguity is 
most prevalent, though, because of what Boyd argues is a principle of ostension, where 
scientists come up with metaphors to make connections between ideas that are otherwise 
difficult to define or explain in words. In an effort to understand, and to provide 
“epistemic access” to a community of scientists, metaphors are created (358). And while 
this is a very valuable, rhetorical practice for educative and communicative purposes, it 
seems apparent that this will often leave holes between the real thing and the way 
scientists perceive it.  
 44 
 Joachim Schummer, in an article on the origins of molecular nanotechnology in 
supramolecular chemistry, goes so far as to suggest that the aesthetics of shapely 
molecules “attract” chemists and cause them to assign metaphorical concepts to the way 
they look. Molecular images that look like baskets, he says, have been named 
“basketane” and ones that look like rotors have been named “rotane.” Such images are 
“aesthetically attractive to chemists” Schummer states, “because they establish a 
symbolic link between the world of ordinary objects and the chemical world of molecules 
because of their interpretive ambiguity” (59). Perhaps even more interesting, scientists 
tend to assign functions to these molecules based on this visual metaphor. Basketene, 
because of their relationship with baskets, are suddenly thought to carry things. From a 
visual-rhetorical perspective, we might say that scientists themselves are being persuaded 
by visual metaphors assigned by nature and then interpreted. The ambiguity of these 
images rhetorically shapes they way science is constructed and perceived. 
 If we were to define visual ambiguity in a single word (and this is a big, 
hypothetical if), one term we might use to shed light on its rhetorical nature is 
‘polysemy.’ Roland Barthes used this term to explain that images consist of a “floating 
chain of signifieds” where those observing an image have the ability—even if 
unintentional—to choose which signified is best representative of the signifier. Images 
inherently carry with them a multiplicity of meanings and it is the role of the author of 
that image and the society in which he or she produced it to direct an intended meaning at 
the viewer. “Hence in every society,” Barthes says, “various techniques are developed 
intended to fix the floating chain of signifieds in such a way as to counter the terror of 
 45 
uncertain signs” (39). One way, Barthes suggests, to direct attention to the intended 
signified is through linguistic persuasion. When I initially viewed Barker’s image of 
osteoporosis, for example, I mentally reverted to a dried oceanic sponge my parents 
collected when I was a child and displayed on their bathtub mantle for years. The caption 
atop the image, however, quickly took me fleetingly away from the depths of the ocean 
and my childhood memory straight to a woman’s femur. Linguistically, rhetorically, my 
interpretation was diverted. The polysemy (the ambiguity) of the image was still there, 
but my attention—my understanding—was deflected.  
 In science, as mentioned above, images rarely stand alone—they are supplemental 
to the text and to the experiment. It is the connectedness of the image and language, 
perhaps, that makes the use and display of images seem so innocuous—if we explain the 
image in the text well enough, all pejorative ambiguity will be removed, right? As 
Barthes says, “The text directs the reader through the signifieds of the image, causing 
him to avoid some and receive others; by means of an often subtle dispatching, it remote-
controls him towards a meaning chosen in advance” (Barthes 40). There is an interesting 
phenomenon that occurs when text and images are juxtaposed. Symbolic messages that 
relate to the observer’s past, culture, and understanding are subdued by the text. Barthes 
mentions further: “the linguistic message…[constitutes] a kind of vice which holds the 
connoted meanings from proliferating, whether towards excessively individual regions or 
towards dysphoric values” (39). What Barthes is suggesting is that images have an initial 
power to project and shape understanding—that they tell us something before we can put 
words to it. The words then codify the image and mask (though not remove) the 
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polysemous attributes.  
 The great fear here is that the image, again, is seen as supplemental. Text is 
perceived to dominate the understanding and what is seen is not considered as important 
as what is read. Yet the underlying polysemous nature of images makes them rhetorically 
powerful in often unforeseen ways. The image is not simply an auxiliary component to 
scientific communication—it shapes the way the science being communicated is 
understood. Punyashloke Mishra has commented on this rhetorical role of the image in 
science: 
Scientific illustrations function within the matix of science, with its hidden 
assumptions and biases. Quite often these biases are invisible to us at this moment 
in time and thus are quite insidious in their effect. Illustrations in a given domain 
are very dependent on the theory they are based on. This is not a one way street—
a theory helps us “see” certain facts and then illustrate them; and these 
illustrations, in turn, support the theory. (193) 
While it is convenient and optimistic to assume that plain language can trump the 
rhetorical nature of visual ambiguity, many image scholars have hinted that the 
ambiguities of the image (though they do not always use the term “ambiguity”) have a 
profoundly rhetorical ability to persuade and shape understanding despite what the text 
juxtaposed to it says. W. J. T. Mitchell, for example, has argued that ekphrasis (where a 
person uses language to describe something visual) is virtually impossible.  James Elkins, 
likewise, has suggested: “No two people will see the same object” (41). Regardless of 
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what is written about an image or how an image is used as an ancillary device to the text, 
rhetoric will ambiguously alter the dimensions in which two people are capable of 
understanding it. Referring to Gorgias’ argument in Plato’s work about how sayings 
cannot describe colors, and further addressing Lyotard, Dobrin and Morey echo their 
arguments: “[Language] may rely upon the metaphor of sight and convey images within 
the mind, but ten words in a poem will necessarily omit the other 990 signifiers that real 
images can convey” (5). There is, in other words, no way to effectively override or 
completely steer meaning of a visual representation through linguistic control as Bacon 
had hoped. Visuals are simply far too rhetorically nuanced to be reined in by language.  
 Visual ambiguity, perhaps to the chagrin of inflexible, hard-nosed empiricists is 
an inescapable consequence of rhetoric’s communicative influence. While control of 
language and the inclusion of linguistic classifications and nomenclature are productive 
scientific tools (placed in juxtaposition to images as a sort of meaning-making steering 
wheel), visually literate scientists must be cognizant of the conspicuously rhetorical 
affects on understanding that create inescapable ambiguities.   
 
Ambiguity and “Black-Boxed” Technology 
Further, improved visual literacy grasps the concept that technology mediates between 
real scientific objects under investigation and the images that display them. To assume 
that the visuals we observe are precisely mimetic representations of the real object is to 
simultaneously accept that the technologies that produced the representations are and 
always will be flawless. Paul Virilio has reminded us why we so often quickly, without 
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compunction, accept photographs as accurate: because the machines that produced them 
(the cameras, microscopes, and telescopes) can do things our eyes simply cannot—they 
capture speeds and sizes and distances beyond the ability of the human eye (21). Perhaps 
intimidated by their superiority, it is easy for us to surrender to their remarkable 
sophistication. If we cannot see it with the naked eye, then the machine that can must 
provide accuracy, right? Perhaps these technologies are more capable than the human eye 
in certain domains, but they are still not necessarily capable of producing faithfully 
mimetic representations. And a representation that cannot be considered as accurate as 
the real thing ought to be considered a reproduction affected by technological ambiguity. 
 One of the conundrums with technologies of our time is that they are often 
complex beyond the knowledge of any one user. A microbiologist, for example, would 
likely know how to use a spectrometer, electron microscope, an electronic sterilizer and 
the high-tech software that accompany them to identify microorganisms, count cells, and 
compare their results with other studies. More than likely, though, many contemporary 
microbiologists would not know how to develop any of these tools on their own, nor fix 
them if a serious malfunction occurred. They may have cursory or even advanced 
knowledge of how tools are calculating and capturing their science. Likely, though, they 
do not know it well enough to understand all the technological nuances that shaped the 
results. The tools they use simply become “black boxed” (Turkle 59), a result nowadays 
partly because technology companies have a high stake in keeping their products’ inner 
workings somewhat hidden from view, “keeping it a secret” (61).  Sherry Turkle 
described a disconcerting (to some) dilemma that seems to be occurring as technologies 
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improve: scientists, unable to fix or create technologies on their own, become hostages to 
the sophistication of the tools they use and the visual glamour they produce to the point 
where anomalies, glitches, shortcomings, and other ambiguities are ignored. Describing 
her colleagues’ experiences, she recounts, 
 
When simulation pretends to the real, buildings look finished before they have 
been fully designed and scientists find no fault in “impossible” molecules that 
could only exist on a screen. Computer precision is wrongly taken for perfection. 
The fantasy, visceral in nature, is that computers serve as a guarantor, a 
“correction machine.” (80) 
 
It may not necessarily be that scientists do not acknowledge these shortcomings with 
technology (in fact, it is likely many do), but that with the pervasive influence of 
advanced technologies of today, scientists simply are learning to acquiesce. In this 
acquiescence, ambiguities in the coding of software and the function of hardware become 
less likely to be given attention. When the advancement of technology is reliant upon 
capitalistic enterprises and science becomes more and more reliant upon technologies 
produced by these entities, the tools that scientists once felt they had control over are no 
longer so controllable. Sure, there are gatekeepers who monitor the use and acceptance of 
certain technologies for certain scientific purposes, but assuring—through personal 
knowledge and technological training—that these technologies are entirely reliable is 
becoming less and less feasible.  
 50 
 This technological impasse in the sciences was perhaps first brought to the 
attention of scientists by Latour. Just as the discoveries of theories and methods are 
introduced to science through social, collective undertakings, Latour argues, so too do 
technologies undergo a process of trial and error. No machine is immediately capable of 
working out the glitches on its own—human intervention, decision-making, and a process 
of removing “endless little bugs…, each being revealed by a new trial imposed by a new 
interested group” will “eventually and progressively” make the technology do what it is 
intended to do (11). It might be inferred from this perspective that no technology can be 
considered error-free. Technologies are designed with purposes specific to the scientist, 
to an organization, or to an industry and they are only as powerful as contemporary 
human knowledge makes them.  
 Literate observers of visuals in the sciences, as a consequence, must attempt to 
recognize where technology has given or removed emphasis on a scientific idea. Formal 
elements of visual representations such as colorization, cropping, layout, and other forms 
of display include some of the more obvious technological ambiguities in scientific 
representations. Some of the less obvious technological ambiguities include the shutter 
speed of a camera, the algorithmic formulas that calculate size, width, and distance of 
objects in a telescope, or the subtle (perhaps non-existent to the human eye) distortions 
caused by a microscope lens.   
 
Metaphysical Ambiguity and the Question of the Real 
Lastly, visual literacy in the sciences recognizes that, outside of method, the human mind 
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is prone to learn and develop science through creativity, imagination, dreams, and extra-
sensorial affects caused by communicative elements. Ambiguity, in other words, 
infiltrates the design and representation of science as a result of the communicator’s and 
the observer’s sense of self. Scientists may hope that a visual representation used to 
explain a phenomenon provides clear, straightforward understandings of information that 
will lucidly translate to their audience. Artists and graphic designers, however, often 
contend that interpretations of visual information are based on human experience that 
trumps methodical and organizational processes. One might recognize metaphysical 
knowledge as the wedge that commonly divides the design fields of usability and user 
experience.  The former will generally contend that the design of information follows 
“universal principles” (Tufte Envisioning 10), that information design is synonymous 
with “efficiency and effectiveness” (Horn 16), and that if it is effective, the design should 
never be noticed (Albers 6). The latter, however, will often argue that traditionally 
scientific approaches to design consider only “predictability, repeatability, and 
mathematical quantifiability, …[precluding] intuition, subjective judgment, tacit 
knowledge, dreams, imagination, and purpose” (Cooley 60).  
 What is in question here is the way in which information is processed and whether 
or not the visual display of it is affected by individuality. It is a question of epistemology 
in relation to visual communication. Can, as Albers suggested, information be designed 
so that the design is not noticed? While his point is made clear, and there is value in 
attempting to make the design of information perfunctorily straightforward, it can easily 
be said that design always affects understanding, whether it is noticed or not. Visual 
 52 
literacy in the sciences, as a result, must be willing to accept that, epistemologically, 
ambiguities emerge as components of the design affect individual understanding.  
 It is not the intent of this section to exhaust the countless and sundry ways in 
which human knowledge has been philosophically explored and how systemic 
organization of information affects understanding. Whether the mind is logical and 
knowledge can be traced through experiences (as John Locke argued) or whether the 
mind functions primarily on a priori subjective senses of being (as Hegel suggested) or 
whether knowledge is a built upon some combination of the polarizing viewpoints of 
empiricism and metaphysics (as Kant and Ficthe claimed) we may never entirely resolve 
philosophically. But it may be inferred from the landscape of ambiguity that I have 
outlined in this chapter that I believe effective visual literacy in the sciences must at least 
lean towards Kant’s and Ficthe’s arguments: that metaphysical, “spiritual” (Fichte’s 
term) knowledge informs experience-based understanding and when they work in 
tandem, human knowledge is more complete. Fichte claimed that the spirit of human 
consciousness “is the ability of the productive imagination to convert feelings into 
representations” (Breazeale 199). His argument was that the function of the human spirit 
was to inform and raise awareness to what we experience in the real, physical world. 
Kant’s description of the way we cognize an image in the mirror provides similar 
understanding. “These objects [hands, ears, faces in the mirror] are surely not 
representations of things as they re in themselves,” Kant says, “and as the pure 
understanding would cognize them, rather, they are sensory intuitions, i.e., appearances, 
whose possibility rests on the relation of certain things, unknown in themselves, to  
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something else, namely our sensibility” (41). What we might pay attention to in these 
lines of thought is that empirical knowledge gained from experience and experimentation 
will be informed by ambiguous and malleable subjective interpretations. 
 Partly in response to the crisis in empiricism based on Hume's critique of Locke 
and others, Heisenberg provided a radical and important way to look at the seemingly 
"non-objective science” of quantum physics. Rather than be grounded in a priori 
knowledge, where our “sensibility” affects our “sensory intuitions” (Kant 41), 
Heisenberg worked with this problem of uncertainty and argued that accounts of 
subatomic reality must include probability functions to account for the uncertainty of 
knowledge in science at the subatomic level. In discussing quantum theory, Heisenberg 
notes that a probability function is built into the way the Copenhagen school of science 
recorded the motion of an electron in order to account for what we cannot know. In the 
Copenhagen School of quantum mechanics, at least, probabilities are used to fill in our 
deficiencies of empirical knowledge. “The probability function combines objective and 
subjective elements,” Heisenberg argues; “It contains statements about possibilities or 
better tendencies (‘potentia’ in Aristotelian philosophy), … and it contains statements 
about knowledge of the system, which of course are subjective in so far as they may be 
different for different observers” (53). The issues of subjectivity and objectivity in 
science are many, but we might at least acknowledge this: that because of the dichotomy 
between mind/senses/technology, and nature, a priori knowledge (whether Kant's 
‘categories of pure reason' or Heisenberg's probability function) reveals the existence of 
ambiguity in accounts of quantum mechanics—whether in expert or public scientific 
 54 
communication—and although not widely accepted in science, perhaps in nature itself 
(Heisenberg 58). 
 One way to look at the metaphysical ambiguities in scientific representation is 
through the metaphorical x-y-z axes described by Gerald Holton. Holton suggests that, in 
traditional scientific practice and thought, science is thought to be discovered and 
represented in two important ways: empirically (which he labels the x-axis) and heuristic-
analytically (which he calls the y-axis). Western scientific discovery has found these two 
axes to be the most convenient and efficient way of propagating science. Quoting Karl 
Popper, however, Holton suggests that there is a third dimension that greatly influences 
the way we understand and explore scientific concepts: through “faith in laws,” 
“anticipations, rash and premature,” and “prejudices”—which he labels as components of 
the z-axis. “This third dimension,” Holton says, “is the dimension of fundamental 
presuppositions, notions, terms, methodological judgments, and decisions” (41). As 
scientists explore and investigate topics, they are influenced by human nature, which 
drives them to be influenced by metaphysical characteristics outside of traditional 
scientific boundaries. Holton suggests that as human beings, we live effortlessly in the z-
axis, that without training or “conscious formulation,” we interpret communicated subject 
matter in particular ways. Scientific practice, he says, teaches scientists to think 
differently, though, leading their discussions and research through a perhaps narrow-
sighted x-y axis that doesn’t recognize the z at work (46).  
 This z-axis is an inescapable part of scientific discovery (and by association, 
scientific communication). We learn through a series interconnected ideas that are 
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influenced by our personal histories, life experiences, and worldviews. Michael Polanyi 
labeled this mode of understanding as “tacit knowledge,” where “a range of conceptual 
and sensory information and images that can be brought to bear in an attempt to make 
sense of something.” The idea of tacit knowledge suggests that when discrepancies occur 
in science between theories and observations, personal assessments and judgments must 
be made about what to do next. “We may conclude,” Polanyi says, “that no science can 
predict observed facts except by relying with confidence upon an art: the art of 
establishing by the trained delicacy of eye, ear, and touch a correspondence between the 
explicit predictions of science and the actual experience of our senses” (31). The 
observation of a scientific representation will be reliant upon z-axes, and tacit knowledge 
domains, influenced by areas difficult to define within the scientific method.  
 We might question, then: what is to be considered real? If scientific 
communication only accurately represents science to the extent that the mind is able to 
remove itself of human penchant and blurred connections between the self and the world, 
can science ever be thought to be “accurately, one-hundred percent correctly” 
represented? The short answer is “probably not.” What the visually literate scientists 
takes from this, though, is that these ambiguities in human understanding shape our 
knowledge into what we perceive as real—perceptions that are, undoubtedly, real. And 
while there is nothing wrong with perceiving scientific discoveries as real and accurate 
(we must, else we drive ourselves crazy)—we must be willing to accept that while reality 
does exist, what is communicated as real is only ambiguously so. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
AMBIGUOUS APPLICATION: FROM LITERATURE TO PRACTICE 
 
“Instead of considering it our task to “dispose of” any ambiguity by merely 
disclosing the fact that it is an ambiguity, we rather consider it our task to study 
and clarify the resources of ambiguity.”  
 
    -Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives 
 
Making Use (and Sense) of Visual Ambiguity 
The landscape of literature on visual ambiguity discussed in the previous chapter places 
scientific representations in a frustratingly complex matrix of meaning making. As I have 
described, past rubrics that have identified grammatical and formulaic elements of visual 
representation and design—while useful in their simplicity—seem to fall significantly 
short of a holistic understanding of visual communication that addresses this matrix. 
Perhaps inferred from the literature in Chapter 2 describing socio-historical, linguistic-
rhetorical, technological, and metaphysical loci in which visual ambiguity emerges, the 
inescapability of visual ambiguity presents a pressing problem: not only is visual 
ambiguity ubiquitous, but the broad ways in which it is present is seemingly so 
ambiguous in and of itself that it is beyond our ability to effectively approach or harness 
it. The trick, then, is to discover the nuances of visual ambiguity and its effects on 
communication in a way that we can productively make use of it—that is, make it 
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applicable to improving visual literacy—while not denying its own ambiguous nature.   
 As I pointed to in the first two chapters, scholarship in visual communication has 
indeed addressed the sundry ways in which visual elements affect understanding. (For the 
purposes of this chapter, “visual elements” refers loosely to any perceptible visual 
component of an image or design, including shapes, colors, or pixilation, as well as entire 
objects, like a cell or human being). However, literature on the visual communication of 
science seems to be fragmented, usually focusing on only one domain of meaning-
making. Graphic and information design specialists, for example, tend to rely heavily on 
concepts related to usability and readability. Tufte’s Envisioning Information, for 
instance, has presented concepts like “chartjunk,” “flatland,” and “micro readings” to 
address the practical, mechanical elements of visual usability; Williams’ Non-Designer’s 
Design Book has proposed “contrast,” “repetition,” “alignment,” and “proximity” as four 
primary design strategies to improve readability; and Bang’s Picture This has suggested 
smoothness, rigidity, color, and location of shapes affect understanding (Picture This). 
Those in social studies have pointed to “social semiotics” (Van Leeuwen, Introducing 
Social Semiotics) and “grammars” (Kress & Van Leeuwen) of visual design, where 
societal values influence design characteristics. Many others have addressed the broadly 
construed concept of language and rhetoric and their synchronous relationship with visual 
representation (Roland Barthes’ “The Photographic Message” is a good example of the 
language-image juxtaposition discussion). Each of these areas of visual communication 
tend to be treated solitarily, which seems to (even if unintentionally) autocratically 
 58 
pigeonhole and elevate one area because it ostensibly pulls more communicative weight 
than another.  
While visual ambiguity has not been expressly discussed as an important part of 
visual literacy in these works, ambiguity does, in fact exist in each of these areas, 
functioning much like a network of communicative tributaries that, streaming 
simultaneously through multiple visual channels, feeds into a larger communicative body, 
like an estuary of mental interpretation. Utilizing the concept of visual ambiguity for 
research and practice, in other words, means embracing the many diverse streams of 
visual design that share part—sometimes equally, sometimes not—in developing the 
body of understanding. 
 To carry this metaphor further, we might look at it this way: Chapter 2 established 
at least four major tributaries, or what we might call “domains,” in which visual 
ambiguity overtly affects interpretation: socio-culturally, linguistic-rhetorically, 
technologically, and metaphysically. Under this four-part perspective of visual ambiguity, 
a viewer’s “estuary” of interpretation and reaction to visual elements of a design or image 
is influenced (fed) by one or multiple domains (tributaries) and even more dimensions 
and types (brooks or creeks) of visual ambiguity. These domains, dimensions, and types 
of visual ambiguity are outlined in detail in Chapter 4. The present chapter identifies 
reasons, complexities, and ways of doing so. 
 As an attempt to improve visual literacy in the sciences, it seems appropriate—
even imperative—to develop a systematic (though still ambiguous) map or grid that 
categorizes and directs researchers and practitioners to the domains of visual ambiguity. 
 59 
This means generating something that, in reality, is not entirely possible, at least not in 
totality: a taxonomy of visual ambiguity as a means to approach meaning-making and 
literacy from divergent but equally valid communicative domains. All of the possible 
nuances of visual ambiguities will likely never be exhaustively delineated, but an attempt 
to do so makes effective visual literacy training in the sciences at least more feasible.  
  Reverting to the oxymoron about “clarifying ambiguity” that I mentioned in 
Chapter 2, classifying visual ambiguity in a taxonomy—separating it into domains (and 
further into dimensions and types)—appears on the surface to be inherently flawed 
because of its inability to be complete. It may be argued, in other words, that visual 
ambiguities will always emerge in new and unexpected ways as societies, languages, 
technologies, and people continue to evolve—thus a taxonomy of visual ambiguity will 
forever exist with gaps and holes. As I mentioned earlier, however, this is not much 
unlike the relationship with science and nature. Science (a metaphor in this case for 
taxonomies) will never be able to completely define and codify nature either, despite 
what empiricists and positivists have long argued.  
 Thomas Sprat and the Royal Society, as we know, hoped science could effectively 
systematize and catalogue nature; these empiricists (and their predecessors centuries 
before them) worked to set up standards so that science could be, in Sprat’s words, 
“[rendered] an instrument whereby mankind [could] obtain a dominion over things” (62). 
Empiricist philosophies in antiquity hoped for scientific practice whereby “the colors of 
rhetoric, the devices of fancy, or the delightful deceit of fables” could be entirely 
removed or at least minimized (62). This “naïve empiricist” perspective sought to 
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understand how the world could be best discovered, epistemologically, while minimizing 
the effects of language and metaphysics. Naïve empiricists, despite this hope, were 
always cognizant of a blurred reality affected by faulty sensoria and the complex 
epistemological problems created with language. They may have loathed these 
inhibitions, but they would not disregard them. For many, empiricism transformed 
(evolved) into what is often referred to as “logical positivism.” Positivists, such as Alfred 
Ayer, have more recently suggested that if any meaningful problems are to be resolved in 
any meaningful way, they must be evaluated with rational methods, protocols, and 
verification practices. He stated: 
 
No statement which refers to a “reality” transcending the limits of all possible 
sense-experience can possibly have any literal significance; from which it must 
follow that the labors of those who have striven to describe such a reality have all 
be devoted to the production of nonsense. (34) 
 
Under this logical positivist perspective, science could not only be entirely objectified, 
controlled, and discovered, but limited to sense experience. Over 350 years since the 
induction of the the Royal Society, many scientific disciplines have attempted to grapple 
with these conundrums. Some recognize science as objective but also impressionable and 
socially constructed (Latour) and always evolving (Kuhn). Paul Feyerabend’s argument 
for “epistemological anarchy” (which suggests that scientific practice is built upon the 
premise of a multiplicity of incessantly overlapping theories) as more logical than the 
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reductionist perspective of methodological monism is particularly poignant. Science, 
according to the philosophical movements brought about by these scholars, is an 
evolutionary process, rooted in society and culture, affected by values, and much more 
open to interpretation. A taxonomy of visual ambiguity derives from these perspectives. 
Even though modern empiricism has its roots in Baconian science, which openly 
acknowledged that the human senses can deceive and that rhetoric is difficult if not 
impossible to escape, Western science has tended to often remain in a chokehold with the 
strict propositions of scientific method, the eradication of subjectivity, and the early 
works of the Royal Society. A taxonomy of ambiguity embraces the hope of early 
empiricists; its purview involves epistemologically reigning in otherwise abstract 
communicative practices of science. Yet, at its heart, such a taxonomy encourages 
adaptability and interpretation; it isn’t entirely anarchist, but it is not unbendingly 
regulated and objectified either. 
 Furthermore, it may be said that the complexity of concepts like society, culture, 
rhetoric, technology, and metaphysics, not to mention ambiguity itself, resists the notion 
of being reduced to the static nature of a taxonomy because taxonomies suggest an 
inflexible framework and terminology. While there is certainly value in this claim, 
depending on perspective, a taxonomy does not have to be comprehensive nor does it 
have to be rigid and unbending to be useful. Rather, we might look at it as serving as an 
important first step, always evolving, because it provides the basis for a lexicon and 
nomenclature from which to work and further investigate. As Robert Houghton noted in 
relation to the widely recognized Bloom’s Taxonomy, “before we can make [the nature 
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of thinking] better, we need to know more of what it is. [Bloom’s Taxonomy] helped to 
create a standard around which further work could be done” (Houghton). Additionally, 
we might view a taxonomy not as a one-size-fits-all categorizing solution, but as a 
rhetorical device with which to shape interpretation of visual ambiguity. Alan Gross, for 
example, suggested that while taxonomies are intended to concretize science by 
differentiating species, they are in themselves rhetorical; he hints that they persuade by 
means of their practicalities of classification while being susceptible to change and 
interpretation. Consider his statement here on taxonomies built for evolutionary biology: 
 
By means of rhetorical reconstruction, evolutionary taxonomy is transformed into 
an interlocking set of persuasive structures. Sub specie rhetoricae, we do not 
discover, we create; plants and animals are brought to life, raised to membership 
in a taxonomic group, and made to illustrate and generate evolutionary theory. 
(93) 
 
A taxonomy is dually systematic and evolving. It is intended as a heuristic guide that 
appropriates language to concepts—perpetually creates concepts, not discovers them—
and cannot be perceived as a final-copy blueprint.   
 Developing a taxonomy of visual ambiguity provides a point of reference for the 
development of heuristics, which can in turn be useful in pedagogy, research, and 
practice where visual literacy is at stake. It might be said that such a taxonomy, which 
essentially deconstructs ambiguity, appropriates theories of aesthetics, rhetoric, culture, 
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technology, and metaphysics and applies them in praxis, offering an adaptable 
foundation, from which further work in scientific visual representations can be done. 
 
Methods of Breaking down Ambiguity 
Thus, to explore what might be considered a deconstruction of ambiguity, foregrounding 
a taxonomy ought to, at least loosely, consider the perspectives of deconstructionism. 
Referencing Derridean and Saussurean perspectives on structuralism and semiology, I 
suggest that the overarching effect of a visual representation is influenced by the 
relationships and hierarchies of one visual element to another. Perception of any visual 
element will ignite mental interpretation based on a network of meanings derived from 
the visual texts. In other words, understanding that is gleaned from the viewing of any 
image is influenced by not any single element in the present image, but by a series of 
viewable elements in any image upon which the viewer might be able to reflect, 
consciously or otherwise. One visual element will always be speaking in relation to 
another. Grossly simplifying Derrida’s famous axiom, “there is nothing outside the text,” 
we might say that any text will be informed by and in turn inform other texts. While 
Derrida was suggesting that our very perception of the world, all that we consider to be in 
existence, is merely text, his point is relevant to observable signs and signifiers: the 
signifieds they ostensibly represent will always be somehow connected to other signs and 
signifiers. They belong to a perpetual matrix of episteme. Understanding from this 
perspective is derived from the connections made between a network of texts. Under this 
pretense, the concept of deconstruction flatly rejects the notion that a priori knowledge 
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has the ability to construct a reality. Simultaneously, though, it suggests that reality may 
only ever be understood ambiguously, since it will always be built upon seemingly 
endless rhetorically nuanced and subjective connections between texts and signs.  
 Such a reality conundrum understandably makes scientists squeamish. Western 
science in general’s ideologies, after all, continue to seek—adamantly—avoiding 
subjectivity in an effort to discover Truth. Reality must exist or there is nothing for 
science to research. A taxonomy built and used with the understanding that it is codifying 
the subjective, even if only in part, might hopefully ease these concerns, especially if we 
consider that the scope is communicative in nature. In other words, deconstructing 
ambiguity helps us better understand how science is communicated and understood, not 
what science actually proves. 
 To think of it more objectively, then, deconstruction (of both textual and visual 
analysis) suggests that an interconnected (and arguably largely ambiguous) network of 
hierarchical signs “constructs” a reality for the person observing the text. Leonard Lawlor 
refers to Descartes’ metaphor of finding the “foundation” of his knowledge, taking apart 
the construction of it piece by piece. Both Descartes and Derrida are suggesting a series 
of relationships that we might look to in order to trace understanding. Proponents of a 
priori meaning-making would likely argue that it is impossible to remove all of the 
appropriate “bricks” of the knowledge construction to discover the foundation. The bricks 
that Descartes is referring to, after all, suggest related experiences. Metaphysical 
knowledge, however, as Kant argued, “must never be derived from [external] experience, 
…which is the source of physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical 
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psychology. [It comes] from pure understanding and purse reason” (Kant 13). Kant’s 
perspective suggests that a foundational understanding must include nuanced and 
idiosyncratically subjective and untainted building blocks outside of experience. Kant 
would see deconstruction as a fantasy—never quite able to fully root out the pure 
understanding. Despite the fact that a taxonomy of ambiguity doesn’t solve this problem, 
I would expect that the scientist cognizant of this conundrum would simply respond to 
Kant and Descartes alike, saying “yes, and that is where ambiguity will always provide 
opportunity for new discovery.”  
 It is worthwhile to note how Thomas Kuhn addressed a similar issue. From his 
perspective, knowledge is built upon a series of connected discoveries that construct a 
paradigm (even if the paradigm is only recognized tacitly).  Like Descartes’ bricks, the 
coalescence of scientific discoveries as Kuhn describes it appears traceable to the 
foundation Descartes was looking for and Derrida hinted at.  Deconstruction from this 
perspective seems very feasible. However, Kuhn likewise considered how understanding 
alters or shifts, that while paradigms are often manifested, there is no guarantee (in fact it 
is rarely likely) that the paradigm will forever remain intact. Kuhn addresses what some 
may observe as serendipitous sparks of genius, perhaps metaphysical illuminations that 
especially enlightened scientists bring forth from pure reason. Rather than codify this 
type of knowledge as a priori, Kuhn suggested that anomalies emerge in foundational, 
paradigmatic understandings of scientific phenomena. These anomalies, which are 
necessary for science to progress, have a curious, but ambiguously traceable beginning as 
well. According to Kuhn: 
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[Discoveries] are not isolated events but extended episodes with a regularly 
recurrent structure. Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e., 
with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced 
expectations that govern normal science. … Assimilating a new sort of fact 
demands a more than additive adjustment of theory, and until that adjustment is 
completed—until the scientist has learned to see nature in a different way—the 
new fact is not quite a scientific fact at all. (53) 
 Kuhn refers to the apparatuses of “normal science,” the theories and procedures that 
combine to create accepted paradigms, as a tentative holding place for scientific 
understanding. As a result of exhaustive research and reflection, these apparatuses 
reconfigure as a novel discovery exposes a weakness. In his words: “And even when the 
apparatus exists, novelty ordinarily emerges only for the man who, knowing with 
precision what he should expect, is able to recognize that something has gone wrong. 
Anomaly appears only against the background provided by the paradigm” (65).  
Addressing the apparatuses of theory and procedure, it might be suggested that 
the scientist who exposes the anomaly is required to deconstruct the paradigm, making 
connections between other or new theories and procedures in order to construct the new 
“reality.” The deconstruction of a scientific paradigm, in other words, delineates its many 
connected parts while embracing the notion that anomalies are lurking, encouraging 
discovery. In communication, deconstruction operates similarly: communication theories 
such as semiotics and grammatology function as apparatuses that frame paradigms for 
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subject areas like literary criticism or even usability studies. Communicative apparatuses, 
when understood with precision, expose anomalies—or ambiguities—that garner new 
understandings. Collections of visual ambiguities in any visual representation may 
expose anomalies drawn out of paradigmatic constructions. 
 Visual communication, particularly in the sciences, wrestles with the very issues 
addressed here. Hardcore empiricists would consider it ideal to be able to deconstruct, 
finitely, the visual elements that affect foundational understanding. The goal would be to 
systematically, through rigorous development of apparatuses, remove all elements that 
spawn ambiguous interpretation. This, of course, in utopian science, would suggest the 
utter removal of communication barriers and frictionless progression of science. 
Deconstructionists, on the other hand, would argue that it is impractical and unwise to 
disregard the anomalies and ambiguities that are present in visual representations because 
they present opportunities for discovery that may otherwise go unrecognized. 
In scientific communication, anomalies and other forms of visual ambiguity 
emerge through reflection upon what the visual elements are intended to represent. 
Lurking amidst the issue of scientific knowledge as it relates to visual communication is, 
we might say metaphorically, a grammatical relationship: that of subject-predicate. 
Anomalies emerge as ambiguities existent between the subject-predicate relationship 
become exploited by in-depth knowledge of both the subject and the predicate. If the 
subject at stake is human understanding/interpretation of a scientific concept, the 
predicate becomes both signifier and signified—the visual element(s) and the scientific 
phenomena they are intended to represent. The subject (meaning or interpretation) is 
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grammatically informed by the predicate (visual elements and scientific phenomena), 
which tend to function as a collection of nouns, verbs, and adjectives. Kress and Van 
Leeuwen, though not the first to do so, most notably use the grammar metaphor in 
Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design, where they say, “Just as grammars of 
languages describe how words combine in clauses, sentences and texts…our visual 
‘grammar’ [describes] the way in which depicted elements—people, places and things—
combine in visual ‘statements’ of greater or lesser complexity or extension” (1).  The 
grammar metaphor is applicable to a taxonomy as we seek to envisage structural 
relationships between individual interpretation and representation by using a systematic 
approach to something invariably idiosyncratic. 
  Gregory Ulmer’s work on “applied grammatology” is a good example of how we 
might, through taxonomy, make knowledge connections between visual elements and 
their signified scientific phenomena. Ulmer cites Derrida’s “single most influential 
proposal—the definition of differance”—as an appropriate understanding of how 
subtleties in language affect the signifier and the signified. Subtle changes in a word, like 
an ‘a’ instead of an ‘e’ in “difference/differance,” Ulmer suggests, are comparable to the 
hieroglyphic representations found in Egyptian pyramids. Often the visual representations 
provided a multiplicity of meanings, depicting one thing, and saying another. Or 
depicting one thing and sounding like something else. In a brief reflection on the history 
of writing, Ulmer points to Derrida’s discussion on the role of homonyms and puns in 
language, which “played a crucial role in extending the resources of language.” Citing 
Derrida in relation to homonymy: “The otherwise motivated sign has acquired arbitrary 
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uses” (qtd. in Ulmer 19). Ulmer further suggests that Derrida relied heavily on using puns 
“for the generation of his strategies…although he does not always pursue their 
consequences.” Derrida’s sign, Ulmer contends, becomes a verb rather than a noun 
because it is not simply a fill-in for the signified, but rather it urges and exploits, dances 
around and within meanings. “It is not constituted by the signifier-signified,” Ulmer 
continues, “but by the signature” (19, italics mine). 
 What we have in Ulmer’s analysis of Derrida is a clearer understanding of the 
functions of language. We might learn that inexplicable, bizarre, unconventional, 
arbitrary, ambiguous, or anomalous injections of language types in writing (including 
puns, homonyms, homophones, and even images) should not be viewed as merely 
rhetorically subversive descriptors used by a communicator (although we cannot rule that 
out, either). Rather, they are a normal and categorical type of communication that does 
not simply accessorize language, but accommodates it. The interpretation that develops 
as a reader transitions from viewing a scratch on a page to forming a thought in the mind 
happens in that “signature” phase.  
 Derrida’s and Ulmer’s analyses have linguistic and grammatical terminologies to 
address where the locus of interpretation takes place: puns, homonyms, and homophones. 
Other critical literary analyses have a host of other linguistic curiosities from which to 
draw (synecdoche, anaphora, chiasmus, euphemism, hyperbole, metonomy, and so forth) 
where interpretation is codified into communicative types, then evaluated against social 
and cultural characteristics. Indeed, Edward Corbett, in reference to Aristotle, categorized 
dozens of figures of speech that effectively give “clearness and liveliness to the 
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expression of our thoughts” (424). Of course, the ambiguity present in such figures of 
speech has been well-documented and loathed by scientists. Consider Longinus’ 
statement: “[The function of figures of speech] is able in many ways to infuse vehemence 
and passion into spoken words, while more particularly when it is combined with the 
argumentative passages it not only persuades the hearer but actually makes him its slave” 
(qtd. in Corbett 424). What is valuable in linguistic and textual analysis, however, is the 
ability to take these ambiguous categorized figures of speech and investigate their 
rhetorical and epistemological value. Without clear categorization of similar visual 
ambiguities (figures of sight, perhaps?), it has been difficult to similarly document how 
exactly visual elements accommodate and communicate information. 
Developing a taxonomy of visual ambiguitiesfunctions similar to the development 
of categorized figures of speech. Being able to codify figures of speech improves literary 
and literate analysis of a larger text.  Figures of speech, as I have noted, give access to 
knowledge through unique interpretable clues that move audiences from the signifier to 
the signified. They have the potential to move an audience, in other words, to discover 
anomaly by deconstructing foundational origins. Developing and using a taxonomy of 
visual ambiguity similarly attempts the deconstruction of visual representation while 
embracing ambiguity’s role for new discoveries existing in anomalies, “pure reason” or 
“a priori” knowledge. In essence, the taxonomy bridges empirical, epistemic reasoning 
with a priori, anomalous awareness and insight by providing the clearly describable 
“planks” upon which literacy can traverse. 
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Taxonomy, Metaphor, and Epistemic Access 
A few words, then, on this “epistemic reasoning.” Visual representations are a form of 
discourse that link actual scientific phenomena to the understanding of scientific 
phenomena. They provide access to new knowledge about a phenomenon, knowledge 
that would likely not have been gleaned otherwise. Terms, definitions, equations, etc. all 
become part of a scientific discourse that, through unique communicative elements, make 
phenomena epistemically accessible. William Frawley wrote: 
What discourse does for science, as the arena of the legitimacy of knowledge, is 
to provide epistemic access to other—even idiosyncratic—versions of scientific 
knowledge for readers, as for example, scientists. What discourse does for science 
is to allow language to extend the senses of the sciences by providing coherent 
articulations of terms which stand in lieu of, and often for only parts of, 
potentially observable phenomena. Discourse provides scientists with epistemic 
access to all sorts of phenomena and explanations that are beyond their immediate 
circumstances, senses, or understandings. (72) 
To summarize, we might say that communication (a broader but related term for 
“discourse”) epistemologically links sensoria to physical phenomena, making knowledge 
accessible at all. Visual communications in this sense function similarly to linguistic 
communications: each consists of a coalescence of signs and signifiers in relation to some 
signified and each is intended to provide clarity and understanding to something 
otherwise abstract, or even something concrete but equally ambiguous or unknowable. 
Each is also inescapably rhetorical and injects the “interpretive ambiguity” that 
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Schummer referred to (see Chapter 2). As mentioned, communicative elements—be they 
linguistic or visual—inevitably possess ambiguities. But these ambiguities possess 
important virtues: they not only expose the productively present anomalies, but they 
make science intelligible and accessible. 
 One of the greatest challenges scientists currently face when using or viewing 
visualizations is knowing how to describe and talk about the visual elements within them. 
Richard Boyd noted that with scientific discovery, catachresis—the misuse of a term or 
metaphor—is a frequent occurrence as scientists attempt to explain the previously 
unexplained. We may argue that there is a similar problem of catachresis evident when 
attempting to become visually literate. That is to say, without an exhaustive, Aristotelian-
esque categorization of the “figures of sight,” appropriate terminology to describe the 
visual elements that represent scientific phenomena is gaping at best, and the scientist is 
often left to use metaphors to describe what they see. Consider what Dr. Alain Viel (one 
of the writers of the Inner Life of a Cell video and Harvard professor) says when 
describing the BioVisions video developed at Harvard University: “In the animation 
there’s a motor protein that’s sort of walking along a line, carrying this round sphere of 
lipids. …It really does look like it’s out for a stroll, like a character in a science fiction 
film” (Marchant). Of course, such metaphorical description is necessary to adapt to 
public audiences, but even scientists talking to scientists struggle with appropriate diction 
to label what they often only see metaphorically. The name “motor protein,” for example, 
has a visual, metaphorical, and epistemological connections to it that scientists use 
amongst themselves, not just to adapt to public audiences. 
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 Because the entities that scientists experiment on almost inevitably assume a 
visual form of some kind that is viewable to the eye, it should probably come as no 
surprise that the terminologies scientists use to describe those entities are frequently 
metaphorical in nature. When we think of scientific theories and phenomena—like string 
theory or electron clouds—it is hard not to recognize the metaphor. This is what 
Schummer was referring to in his description about molecules, suggesting that scientists 
name molecules that look like baskets basketane and ones that look like rotors, rotane. A 
significant reason for this is simply the way in which we understand and use language, in 
particular English. Linnaean nomenclature, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
4, is a good example of how language metaphors shape scientific thought. Sean Morey, 
for example, notes that the permit, a type of fish, is scientifically named “Trachinotus 
falcatus,” which, when translated, means “armed with scythes.” The fish is not actually 
“armed” with anything, but the metaphor is appropriated to discourse, which in turn 
“[constructs]…association” between image and word.  We actually have to work hard to 
avoid using a metaphor to describe something less familiar. Lakoff & Johnson indicated, 
after all, that language in general is metaphorical, that we “live by” metaphors, and 
scientific communication is no exception. The use of language to describe something 
visual, or ekphrasis as Mitchell elaborates on in Picture Theory, represents the basis of 
one of the four domains of visual ambiguity—linguistic-rhetorical—discussed in Chapter 
2. What we may pay close attention to is the role that metaphor plays in making science 
accessible and how a taxonomy might assume a similar role. 
 In “Metaphor and Theory Change: What is a ‘Metaphor’ a Metaphor for?” 
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Richard Boyd argues that metaphors function to assist scientists in their understanding. 
“The use of metaphor,” he says, “is one of many devices available to the scientific 
community to accomplish the task of accommodation of language to the causal structure 
of the world” (358). Metaphors, Boyd suggests, provide two important functions for 
scientists. At the surface level, metaphors initially provide ostensive power to the 
description of phenomena that are new to scientists. That is to say, they provide 
analogous, real-world counterparts, examples whereby terminologies can be drawn in 
order to conceptualize the phenomena. Perhaps even more profound, Boyd further 
proposes that metaphors have the unique ability to actually shape the way in which 
science is conducted, that they epistemologically give form to how scientists view the 
way in which the world operates. By framing a scientific phenomena within the structure 
of a metaphor, scientists potentially shape the development of their work, paradigms, and 
knowledge based largely in part by the metaphor’s linguistic relationships with the 
palpable world. He further elaborates: 
 
By this I mean the task of introducing terminology, and modifying usage of 
existing terminology, so that linguistic categories are available which describe the 
causally and explanatorily significant features of the world. Roughly speaking, 
this is the task of arranging our language so that our linguistic categories “cut the 
world at its joints.” (358) 
 
If we are to take Boyd literally (even if only on occasion, as Boyd says this is rare) this 
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means that some aspects of the world as we know them are understood, that is accessed 
epistemically, through the lens of a metaphor. The extent to which that metaphor might 
be stretched may potentially, then, have the ability to limit or alter the way in which we 
can grasp how that part of the world functions. One example Boyd gives is how the 
human brain has been metaphorically tied to an information processor. Such a metaphor 
has become so entrenched within the field of cognitive psychology, that the functions of 
the brain may never really be able to be understood differently.   
 What is in question here is how effective language can be in epistemologically 
framing a scientific community’s understanding of the properties of the world. How well, 
in other words, do metaphors function to provide epistemic access—Boyd’s phrase to 
describe how tools (like metaphors and other reference systems) affix language to real 
world phenomena? Boyd suggests that metaphors can act like ostensive reference terms 
that not only point to real world phenomena, but open them up in new ways. (Boyd is far 
less concerned about the vocabulary assigned to scientific phenomena as he is about how 
science proceeds based on the relationships between vocabularies. His argument, whether 
a scientist is willing to take it to its extreme or not, at least raises important questions 
about the role of communication and the development of science.) Because the limited 
nature of metaphors can only ambiguously—that is, never in perfect mimesis—represent 
the world in which we live, any scientific concept associated with a metaphor might be 
considered ambiguous and incomplete. Boyd has suggested that some scientific 
disciplines are so entrenched in a metaphor, they may always be locked into an epistemic 
interpretation framed within the metaphor’s peripheries. Moving back from Boyd to the 
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grammar metaphor, I suggest that human understanding built upon metaphors is reliant 
upon a deconstruction of the predicate, or the signs and signifiers that collectively 
assemble understanding.  
 In sum, that metaphors—and, really, scientific communication generally—
provide scientists with an imperfect but at least accessible epistemic grasp of the reality 
of the world. Metaphors provide enough substance that a compressible shape or frame 
can be established, communicated, deconstructed, and analyzed by scientific 
communities.  They can also be adaptable to multiple environments. A taxonomy (or the 
categories delineated in it), like a metaphor, gives shape and vocabulary to the otherwise 
inexplicable components of visual ambiguity. In this sense, a taxonomy of visual 
ambiguity is a metaphor: it, like any other linguistic metaphor, represents the framework 
to nominally, rather than ostensively (Boyd), establish relational properties that exist 
between the terms. A taxonomy effectively encapsulates terminologies for productive 
usage and further research because it provides scientific communities epistemic access to 
otherwise abstract notions. Its limitations in trajectory, while certainly present, will never 
be so great as to trump its practical and adaptable uses. 
 
Toward a Taxonomy of Visual Ambiguity 
With these limitations of language in mind, the application of a taxonomy as it relates to 
visual ambiguity, then, must embrace a dual ideology—that visual ambiguities are both 
classifiable and malleable. A taxonomy of visual ambiguity serves to effectively 
deconstruct the visual elements that collectively work together to form a scientific 
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representation while simultaneously exposing new relationships and what Kenneth Burke 
refers to as “alchemic opportunities” that will spawn new investigations (xix). The 
taxonomy of visual ambiguity expressed in the following chapter is developed from this 
viewpoint. Its perfunctory goal is to provide a perpetual system for codifying visual 
elements, a system that functions in an iterative triad that classifies, names, and relates 
visual ambiguities. By providing a lexicon of visual ambiguity from which to work, its 
broader scope is to enhance epistemic access through improved literate awareness of the 
visual meaning making process. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
A TAXONOMY OF VISUAL AMBIGUITY 
 
“If it were possible to build the missing bridge between persuasion and scientific 
knowledge, then one would be in the best position for overcoming the tension 
between ‘internal’ and ‘external,’ and between normative and descriptive 
philosophies of science.” 
  -Marcello Pera, The Discourses of Science 
 
Ambiguity and the Making of Meaning: Converging Method and Imagination 
The proposition in the previous chapters is primarily threefold: that visual ambiguities 1) 
inescapably affect meaning making in nearly all visual representations of science, that 2) 
their presence provides important (“alchemic”) opportunities for new insight and 
epistemic awareness, and that 3) our ability to harness and effectively preserve 
ambiguous visual elements is dependent upon the construction of an amorphous 
framework—a systematic but flexible guide to the visual elements that affect meaning. In 
essence, I have proposed a foundation for the development of a taxonomy that 
encourages scientific discovery and meaning making by embracing the communicative 
ambiguity of art and design. Whether the taxonomy proposed in the present chapter be a 
productive space for Kant’s “pure reason” to emerge, Kuhn’s “anomalies” to surface, or 
Ulmer’s “signature” to play out, its purpose is essentially the same: a taxonomy of visual 
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ambiguity establishes stronger literate awareness of the epistemic “happenings” in visual 
communications that spark scientific imagination—that is, a taxonomy of visual 
ambiguity potentially triggers insight and foresight into the meaning-making process of 
scientific communication.  
 What is at stake in the creation of a taxonomy of visual ambiguity, then, is the 
ability to approach visual communication of the sciences in a way that promotes the 
convergence of reason and imagination without discounting either. Kenneth Burke draws 
us to the importance of this convergence when he suggested that the ideological 
separation of art from science hindered imagination in both areas. Rather than 
considering reason as “vocational” and imagination as “vacational,” Burke says, a hybrid 
of the two “represents a joined duality of motives … [symbolizing] the union of a 
labyrinthine imagination … with the rationality of a poetic medium developed by 
deliberate conscious sophistication” (224). Burke suggests that we should never pit art 
against science, but rather we should understand each as an important part of discovering 
truth (224). In this vein, it may be said that a scientist’s greatest resource for productivity 
is his or her ability to channel imagination through methodical artistry—that is, through 
appropriation of a flexible but comprehensible and transferable system. The imagination 
needs a place to thrive—somewhere between the subject (human understanding) and the 
predicate (the science and the communication of it), in the “anomalies” and ambiguities 
of the visual as I addressed in the previous chapter. 
 The scope of this chapter is to expressly formulate a taxonomy that appropriately 
systematizes the classifying and naming of visual ambiguities while further establishing 
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ways in which these ambiguities ambiguously relate to and affect each other. Marcello 
Pera has said: “science is characterized by scientific method, but a precise 
characterization of scientific method destroys science” (28). With this in mind, my 
purpose is to methodically categorize visual ambiguity for productive use without 
destroying it. The taxonomy, as presented, is intended to be an amalgamation of scientific 
procedure while preserving a space for imagination. It provides, we might say, the legend 
to a map, but no prescribed journey or destination. It serves as an open-ended method. 
The idea is that researchers, educators, and practitioners can clearly follow but flexibly 
adapt the taxonomy to be used with a wide array of visual communications in any of their 
own specific disciplines.  
 The first two purposes of the taxonomy presented in the following pages seem, at 
least superficially, perfunctory (systematic and mechanical) in nature: the first purpose of 
the taxonomy is to establish categories of visual ambiguities from which we can draw 
comparisons and relationships; the second purpose is to provide a naming system 
whereby scientific communicators can appropriate the types of visual ambiguity into 
discourse and research. The categorizing and naming found in the taxonomy follow 
traditional scientific models used by scientists such as Aristotle, Linnaeus, and Bloom. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the taxonomy presented in this chapter 
appropriates the rhetorical model of Burke’s dramatistic pentad (which suggests motives 
for action involve acts, agents, agency, scenes, and purposes)—reconfiguring it into a 
visual tetrad (where the agent is removed from the analysis)—to show the complexities 
of the relationships between the types and categories of visual ambiguity. With this third 
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purpose of the taxonomy, ambiguity effectively reigns as a rhetorical device for 
comparing and contrasting how visual elements work independently and in harmony to 
affect meaning-making. The parts of the taxonomy (those mechanical and those 
rhetorical) working in tandem follow what Alan Gross has said about the taxonomies of 
evolutionary biology: “the relationship between these two [science and rhetoric] is not 
rivalry but complementary” (50 The Place of Rhetoric in Science Studies). Ambiguity, as 
presented in the tetradic model of visual communication, suggests that ambiguity’s 
presence is a natural and recurrent part of the human imagination and the imagination’s 
affect on understanding science.   
 
The “Paradox of Substance” in Visual Ambiguities 
The preservation of ambiguity in visual representations of science, then, seems natural 
and important. Perhaps paradoxically, however, its classification for the sake of clarity 
seems to annul its primary role of encouraging discovery in the meaning-making process. 
One of the paramount functions of any taxonomy, after all, is to establish categories and 
names of the subjects under investigation so as to systematize and organize practices 
within a discipline. The systemization and defining practices are often intended to thwart 
ambiguity in favor of precision. Aristotle’s attempt to classify living things, for example, 
provided names for vertebrate and invertebrate animals so as to clearly distinguish—for 
future generations of scientists—how they differ. His student, Theophrastus, classified 
types of plants, some of which to this day are named after his original terms. The clarity 
and precision of classification has become a staple for scientific discourse. Other 
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taxonomies developed by Plinius, Linnaeus, and, more recently, Benjamin Bloom, have 
all sought to establish clear-cut descriptors used for identification and separation.   
The difference, perhaps, between the taxonomy of visual ambiguity presented 
hereafter and most other taxonomies of science, is that the former embraces a 
preservation (as opposed to eradication) of ambiguity. It encourages a conscious 
awareness of paradox and ambiguity within the categorizations and names. The 
definitions associated with types and categorizations of visual ambiguities provide more 
loose boundaries than those often found in traditional taxonomies. The looseness in 
definitive boundaries provides a space for epistemic alchemy, that is to say, a rethinking 
or retooling of the way in which a visual element communicates. There are, in other 
words, multiplicities of ways to define any given type of visual ambiguity (which, in turn, 
gives flexibility to its scope and influence) because each type of visual ambiguity’s 
substance is only explicitly valid in relation to other visual ambiguities.  
 Burke famously described the complexity of defining anything: “To tell what a 
thing is,” he argued, “you place it in terms of something else” (24). Burke suggests that 
Aristotle’s conceptualization of things (like stones or trees) could be considered without 
regard to anything else; they could be “considered ‘in itself’” (25). Spinoza, according to 
Burke, had a different take: he suggested that nothing can be defined independently, that 
“each single object in the universe is ‘defined’ … by the other things that surround it” 
(25). Traditional scientific taxonomies often take the Aristotelian perspective—that is, 
they assume a definition of any given object is noncontextual. The taxonomy of visual 
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ambiguity appropriates Spinoza’s view, which recognizes the paradox of substance. 
Definitions of visual ambiguities are outlined, but only as reference points; it is expected 
that the reader will observe each definition of the types and categories of visual 
ambiguities as relational to and contingent upon other types and categories of visual 
ambiguities.  
 As such, the following section (which classifies and names visual ambiguities) 
perfunctorily adapts what appears to be an Aristotelian taxonomic presentation of visual 
ambiguities. This is the systemic, methodical component of the taxonomy, which 
importantly (if not dryly) establishes a system whereby visual ambiguities can be 
appropriated into scientific communication discourse. I encourage the reader, however, to 
recognize that the definitive classifications and names of visual ambiguities set forth 
hereafter are only definitive insomuch as they are noncontextual or unrelated to other 
visual ambiguity types (which is rare if ever). The richer value of the taxonomy emerges 
in the subsequent section, where I establish a rhetorical model as a means for recognizing 
communicative relationships (and ratios) between visual ambiguities. A case example of 
how the rhetorical model of the taxonomy might be heuristically appropriated into 
research and education is the scope of Chapter 5.      
A Systematic Model of Taxonomy: Classifying and Naming 
With the paradox of definition and substance in mind, I suggest, then, that the classifying 
and naming of visual ambiguities is a necessary first step in establishing the exoskeleton 
of visual ambiguity. Alan Gross argued that in evolutionary taxonomy, “words and 
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pictures [on their own] bring potential species to life” (101 “The Origin”). The 
categorization of visual ambiguities has the same potential. Categorizing and naming 
visual ambiguities, I propose, is important for discourse in scientific communication and 
for the improvement of visual literacy because it (at least foundationally) raises 
consciousness to the sundry visual elements that affect meaning. Thus, in the following 
sections, I look to Carl Linnaeus and Benjamin Bloom for widely accepted classifying 
and naming practices useful for the categorization of visual ambiguity.  
 The taxonomic system scientists use in biology today, whereby organisms are 
named after their genus and species, is part of a larger categorical system, taught to most 
elementary-age children. This system includes a hierarchical organization starting with 
“kingdom” and moving to “phylum,” “class,” “order,” “family,” “genus” and “species.” 
Other classification systems, such as Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ taxonomies on plants 
do not show evidence of such hierarchical organization. Regardless of the presence of 
hierarchy, though, categorization is clearly at the heart of taxonomies. Categorizing, after 
all, makes application of concepts more accessible. As Tilton noted of Linnaeus’ work on 
The Species of Plants: “[His] method, in which plants were grouped together according to 
the number of stamens in their flowers…was not accurate, but it was easy to use and thus 
readily adapted by scientists who were continually discovering more new varieties of 
plants” (Tilton).  
A contemporary example of the functionality of categorization is Bloom’s 
Taxonomy of Educational Objectives. In 1949, Benjamin S. Bloom initiated a project that 
would result in an educational classification system for learning objectives. What Bloom 
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and his colleagues determined to create was a functional system that moved educational 
theory into practice. The hope was that by classifying learning objectives into a series of 
terms and definitions, educational research could be more widely applied across 
disciplines. In other words, if a common language for educators were to be established 
through taxonomy, curricula and examinations could be designed easier, under much 
more specific learning objectives. Bloom and his colleagues’ hope was that this 
taxonomy would assist in the development of instruction and examination that needed to 
meet local, state, and national standards while reducing overlap and redundancy in 
development (Krathwohl).  
 To achieve this goal, Bloom’s Taxonomy established three domains of leaning: 
the cognitive domain (where a person learns intellectually, through remembering, 
applying, and evaluating knowledge), the affective domain (where a person learns 
emotively, through responding to phenomena and internalizing values), and the 
psychomotor domain (where a person learns physically, through the development of 
sensory cues and motor skills) (Martin, “Bloom’s Learning Domains”). Each of these 
domains provided resources for educators to use in order to improve learning objectives. 
Bloom’s three domains of learning objectives effectively did for education what 
Linnaeus’ categorization of the animal kingdom did for biology: they systematized 
learning objectives by pointing to specific verbs (species or types of actions) that could 
be applied to learning. Bloom’s categorization system, much like Linnaeus’, was devised 
to standardize disciplinary practices. If an educator wanted to teach a student how to 
“apply” mental knowledge, they could look to the cognitive domain, then the 
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“application” dimension, where he or she could use terms like “modify,” “construct,” or 
“produce”—verb types that function to improve learning objects and, in essence, 
pedagogy.  
For example, if an instructor wanted her students to learn important events in U.S. 
history, she might make a vague statement like, “students will know major events….” 
Bloom’s taxonomy, however, would encourage the changing of the verb “know” to 
recall, making the objective to be clearer: “students will recall 10 major events of the 
Civil War” (Cruz, “Bloom’s Revised Taxonomy”). Each of Bloom’s categorical domains 
is further divided into “dimensions,” which distinguish certain types of cognitive learning 
(knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation). The series 
of verbs (recall, survey, memorize, model, draw, weigh, etc.) assigned to each learning 
dimension within the designated cognitive domain made the theoretical approach to 
learning and curriculum design much more practical and accessible. 
 The taxonomy posited in this chapter assumes a similar model, placing visual 
ambiguities in three categorical milieus: domains, dimensions, and types. Based on the 
literature presented in Chapters 2 and 3, four domains of visual ambiguity are most 
conspicuous: socio-cultural, linguistic-rhetorical, technological, and metaphysical. It is 
under these four broad domains that visual ambiguity is classified. Visual ambiguities can 
be further classified into two dimensions—areas where learning occurs—namely, 
affective and cognitive dimensions. Within each domain/dimension, there may be 
seemingly endless types of visual ambiguities to be discovered and named, just as 
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discoveries of species of animals continue to fill voids in family and genus categories. 
Figure 4.1, below, represents the classification system for visual ambiguities.  
 
Figure 4.1: Taxonomic Wheel of Visual Ambiguity: Domains and Dimensions 
 
Represented as a wheel, the four domains of visual ambiguity are non-hierarchical. Under 
each domain, there are dimensions, the affective and cognitive. The blank areas in each of 
the dimension triangles represent the areas where types of visual ambiguity are placed, 
after scientific communities label them. Below I describe how each of the dimensions and 
domains of visual ambiguity are defined, followed by categorical lists of the types (and 
their respective dimensions and domains)  
The Dimensions of Visual Ambiguity 
Visual design elements, while epistemologically falling into one (or possibly more) of the 
four domains defined, must be classified in terms of their individual effects on the 
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viewer—whether they be cognitive or affective.  The cognitive and affective dimensions 
of the four domains suggest two major ways in which viewers are affected by an image—
mentally (logically) and emotively (viscerally). It may be determined, for example, that a 
technological type of visual ambiguity, such as image resolution, might evoke a visceral 
reaction. Lack of professionalism, for instance, may be the emotive response to the ethos 
of the scientist who produced the image. An empirical study on the psychological 
reaction to the visual ambiguity type (the image resolution) would be necessary to 
determine if, indeed, there was an emotive reaction that affected interpretation of the 
image. If so, “image resolution” could be classified in the affective dimension of the 
technological domain (but in the malleability of this taxonomy, it may be classified in the 
cognitive dimension as well). Below, the two dimensions are defined in more detail.  
The Cognitive Dimension 
The cognitive dimension of visual ambiguity is the locus of meaning making where 
design elements affect readability, usability, and accessibility. In other words, the viewer 
of an image might ask him/herself if some element, which is classified as a specific 
“type,” of the design distracts, distorts, or improves their understanding of it. Is the most 
important object in the image or design hidden by noise, such as colors or pixilation? Are 
the elements appropriately arranged? Is the text that supplements it useful to 
apprehension or is it misleading in some way? The cognitive dimension of specific types 
of visual ambiguity might be viewed as the superficial and introductory stage in meaning-
making, where attention is paid to communicative elements that serve a perfunctory 
purpose in guiding the viewer to grasp a very specific concept. Emotional reaction and 
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experience in the viewing are not considered in the cognitive domain. This is why the 
evaluation of visual texts based strictly on cognition raises important ethical issues.  
 While visual ambiguities that fall within the cognitive dimension of any of the 
domains plays an important part in affecting meaning making, caution may be expressed 
to the scientific communicator that assumes the cognitive dimension of visual 
representations is the only dimension at work. Such a “naïve empiricist” perspective has 
potential to obstruct alertness to perhaps more serious and influential dimensions of 
visual ambiguity (which is what Ann Wysocki was arguing in regards to the “well-
designed” ad of a nude woman, where we fail to recognize how the content is shaping our 
viewing just as much, if not more so, than the design and layout.) In this light, 
information design and usability perspectives that value form more than content are 
treading only in shallow waters of visual literacy (see Edward Tufte, Envisioning 
Information, Robert Horn, “Information Design,” or Albers & Mezur, Content & 
Complexity). Wherever there exists a type of visual ambiguity that cognitively affects 
understanding, it is imperative that we simultaneously ask: but can/does this type also 
affect us emotionally? Why? This is not to say that visual ambiguities that fall in the 
cognitive dimension are not important; indeed, they play a very vital role in how 
representations are interpreted. 
 
The Affective Dimension 
The affective dimension of visual ambiguity, thus, is the locus of meaning making where 
human character, emotion, and values play a significant role in the interpretation of 
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visuals. Richard Buchanan, speaking of design in general (of both two- and three-
dimensional designs) noted: 
 
There is a deep reflexive relation between human character and the character of 
the human-made: character influences the formation of products and products 
influence the formation of character in individuals, institutions, and society. (232)  
 
The complexity of Buchanan’s statement is reflected in the affective dimension of visual 
ambiguity, where a person viewing a scientific image cannot escape the influence human 
nature, idiosyncrasy, spirituality, and socially-constructed worldviews. In many cases, a 
design element may have little emotive effect on a viewer—like the contours in an 
abstracted black-and-white diagram of a gene, labeled perhaps as type “abstraction” in 
the “technology” domain—and in these cases, cognition is the primary influence. 
However, if the abstracted contours represent genetic modification, an affective response 
to the design is likely to reframe understanding of it. Or, if an image simply looks 
attractive—based on design characteristics like patterns and color scheme—a visceral, 
affective reaction occurs. Cognitive scientist Donald Norman has suggested that such 
reactions are both natural (humans generally prefer symmetrical faces) and cultural (some 
cultures prefer fat people, others thin). Either way, design elements have a powerful 
ability to affect visceral reaction to and, thus, interpretation of the design (Emotional 
Design 66).  
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The Domains of Visual Ambiguity 
The definitions of the domains below are drawn from the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 
and, as such, are only briefly described here. 
The Socio-Cultural Domain of Visual Ambiguity 
Elements of an image or design that epistemologically affect meaning because of their 
connectedness to socially-constructed perspectives or values systems fall within the 
socio-cultural domain of visual ambiguity. Representations of scientific objects 
particularly—like mitochondria, stem cells, or anatomical structures, (but also visual 
elements like color and patterns)—found within an image or design communicatively 
affect culturally-contingent, amorphous social histories. As Shea indicated about the 
socially-developed narratives of genes, only diachronically can we recognize that 
Mendel’s work is only a small part of what scientific societies today consider Mendelism 
(How the Gene Got Its Groove). One understood history of a visually represented object 
may very well be different than an alternative, though equally logical, history. 
Furthermore, interpretation of visual objects and design elements is affected by social 
conceptions of aesthetics in relation to spectacle, as Hal Foster has noted (Design & 
Crime); they will be inevitably influenced by what Feyerabend has deemed as “social 
values”; and they will be conceptually shaped by governments, institutions, and 
organizations that standardize paradigms. In essence, visual ambiguities of the socio-
cultural domain are visual elements that are tied to specific historical narratives, societal 
aesthetic preference, political influence, socially-accepted values, economies, or 
otherwise general regulations of institutional apparatuses. Types of visual ambiguities 
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that can be found in the socio-cultural domain may include those found in Table 4.1 
below.  
 
Table 4.1: Socio-Cultural Domain of Visual Ambiguity 
 
Socio-Cultural Domain of Visual Ambiguity 
 
Visual ambiguities of this domain involve visual elements that are tied to specific historical narratives, societal aesthetic preference, 

















































Elizabeth Parthenea Shea suggests that 
histories of scientific ideas are socially 
constructed. A visual ambiguity labeled 
“historical” suggests that the history of 
the object/element visually represented 
is interpretable based on divergent 
histories, constructed and accepted 
paradigms within a field of inquiry. 
(How the Gene Got Its Groove) 
 
Paul Feyerabend argues that communal 
values (such the Western concept of 
expediency) affect acceptance or 
rejection of a particular concept. Value 
ambiguities are present when conflicting 
value judgments are possible. (Farewell to 
Reason) 
 
Hal Foster suggests that societies 
determine the difference between 
“highbrow” and “lowbrow” art. Art to 
some may be considered spectacle to 
others. Spectacle ambiguities are present 
when a viewer struggles to determine 
the difference between authentic visual 
elements and commercialized ones, or 
artistic rather than made spectacle. 
(Design & Crime) 
 
Thomas Kuhn has indicated that new 
knowledge materializes as an anomalous 
discovery emerges beyond the 
peripheries of an accepted paradigm. 
Anomaly ambiguities are present when a 
viewer (knowledgeable about the 
The history of stem cell 
research is known only 
fragmentally to a viewer, 
leaving knowledge gaps in 
how the image of a stem cell 








































X-rays might be viewed as 
an invasion of privacy, thus 
images of them might spark 





Artistic rendering of a 
mitochondrion, though 
meticulously designed for 
education, might be seen as 
a promotional tool, sparking 






An image of stomach lining, 
such as one published by 
Barry Marshall, shows visual 
signs of a bacterium, 













science under investigation) recognizes 
something particularly unique about a 
scientific phenomenon, something that 
has not been noticed or accepted by a 
community before. (Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions) 
 
In his article “What is an Apparatus?” 
Giorgio Agamben indicates that in 
societies, there are “[sets] of practices, 
bodies of knowledge, measures, and 
institutions that aim to manage, govern, 
control, and orient…behaviors, 
thoughts, and gestures of human 
beings.” Oikonomia ambiguities are 
visual elements that are designed under 
definitive practices in order to orient the 
viewer to a common belief or practice 










symbols in certain 
communities (like the " ” 
micro symbol) that orient 
the viewer to rethink 
proportions.  
 
thought was not able to 









An institutionalized image 
of Mars, taken by NASA, a 
governmental organization 
funded by taxpayers who 
may have conflicting 
emotional interest in 
supporting such an 
institution 
    
The Linguistic-Rhetorical Domain of Visual Ambiguity 
Elements of an image or design that epistemologically affect meaning because of their 
connectedness to language fall within the linguistic-rhetorical domain of visual 
ambiguity. In other words, something about the visual element is tied to something 
textual or language-based. For example, Roland Barthes has suggested that whenever 
images are juxtaposed with text, “the words…are parasitic on the image” (25). Visual 
elements are interpreted much differently when influenced by the text that describes it. 
Furthermore, Joachim Schummer has indicated that when visual objects look like objects 
in the real world, we make a connection through language, assigning metaphorical 
descriptions to the phenomenon, “[establishing] a symbolic link between the world of 
ordinary objects and the [world of visual scientific phenomena] through their 
interpretative ambiguity” (59). The linguistic metaphor, in other words, redefines the 
visual interpretation. Visual ambiguities, hence, of the linguistic-rhetorical domain 
involve visual elements that are either placed directly in juxtaposition with text or that are 
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defined and explained with metaphorical or tropological terminologies. Types of visual 
ambiguities that can be found in the linguistic-rhetorical domain may include those found 
in Table 4.2 below.  
 
Table 4.2: Linguistic-Rhetorical Domain of Visual Ambiguity 
 
Linguistic-Rhetorical Domain of Visual Ambiguity 
 
Visual ambiguities of this domain involve visual elements that are placed in juxtaposition with text, exhibit metaphorical  
or tropological characteristics, are related to grammatical counterparts such as subjunctive verb tense, or qualify as if a  















































In “The Photographic Message,” 
Roland Barthes, suggests that text 
“changes [the] structures” of an 
image, “[signifying something 
different to what is shown.” 
Juxtaposition ambiguities are 
places where text influences and 
orients to understand something 
not necessarily perceptive from 
the visual alone. 
 
Joaquim Schummer suggests that 
images of scientific phenomena 
often assume shapes that 
symbolically link to something in 
the world of ordinary objects. 
Symbolism ambiguities are 
present representations where the 
viewer makes a link between the 
shape/appearance of an abstract 
phenomena to something tangible 
in the “physical” world. 
 
Joaquim Schummer argues that 
concepts/terminologies related to 
human capacities are often 
assigned to otherwise difficult-to-
understand scientific phenomena. 
 
Captions, labels, titles, 
headings that are 
juxtaposed, aligned, or 
placed in close proximity 
to visuals, affecting 






A molecule that looks like 
a basket affects the way 
the viewer thinks that 
molecule is supposed to 








Visual conceptions that 
encourage a viewer to 
associate human 
characteristics to a non-
human object, like when 
 
Captions, labels, titles, 
and headings that, 
through rhetorical word 
choice, affect emotional 



















Visual conceptions that 
encourage a viewer to 
associate human 
characteristics to a non-









are visual elements that are 
linguistically assigned human 
characteristics.  
 
Richard Boyd has suggested that 
metaphors “[accommodate] 
language” to the causal structure 
of the world. Other related 
linguistic devices use ostension, 
making use of examples to 
describe phenomena because it is 
difficult to explain. Ostensive 
ambiguities are uses of visual 
elements  
 
bacteria have to make a 
“choice,” making viewers 
cognitively interpret the 
phenomenon differently 
 
Visual analogies, puns, 
allegories, synecdoche, 
and so forth that affect 
readability and 
understandability, as in an 
infographic that uses 
pictograms to describe 
populations 
bacteria have to make a 
“choice,” making them 
emotively interpret the 
phenomenon differently 
 
Visual analogies, puns, 
allegories, synecdoche, 
and so forth that affect 
emotional response, as in 
the pictograms in an 
infographic used 
especially to appeal to 
emotional response  
 
The Technological Domain of Visual Ambiguity 
Elements of an image or design that epistemologically affect meaning because of their 
connectedness to technologies fall within the technological domain of visual ambiguity. 
Mark J. P. Wolf suggested that technology is often used to enhance, conceptualize, or 
otherwise render visual objects to show what “could be, would be, or might have been” 
(417). In other words, renderings are often created to portray what our eyes cannot see, 
but what we “might” see, if our eyes were capable (420). In a similar vein, ambiguity 
emerges as a result of technology when interactivity (like in a simulation or video game) 
is unpredictable (see Gasperini’s “The Role of Ambiguity in Multimedia Experience”); 
when images are abstracted and simplified with technology (see McCloud’s 
Understanding Comics or Mishra’s “The Role of Abstraction in Scientific Illustration”); 
or when images are otherwise artistically rendered with technology, as in an animation. 
Visual ambiguities of this domain involve visual elements where technology affects 
resolution, true color, magnitude, interactivity, abstraction, or conceptualization. Types of 
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visual ambiguities that can be found in the technological domain may include those found 
in Table 4.3 below. 
 
Table 4.3: The Technological Domain of Visual Ambiguity 
 
Technological Domain of Visual Ambiguity 
 
Visual ambiguities of this domain involve visual elements where technology affects resolution,  
true color, magnitude, interactivity, abstraction, or conceptualization. 
 
 
Technological “Types”  














































When visual communication becomes 
interactive—like in a simulation, video 
game, or on a website—technological 
limitation affect the extent to which a 
simulated experience is open-ended. 
Choices become clear or obfuscated as a 
person moves within the interactive 
medium. The narrative, affected by 
interactive technology, affects 
interpretation. Ambiguity in these 
instances is closed-ended if a certain 
conclusion is inevitable. It is open-ended 
if there is no certain outcome or 
choices. Video game developer and 
information designer Jim Gasperini has 
compared this kind of “open-ended” 
and “closed-ended” ambiguity to the 
uncertain experiences and outcomes in 
media such as Choose Your Own 
Adventure novels, video games, and 
interactive plays. 
 
Kress and Van Leeuwen claim that 
visual modalities include colors, hues, 
contrast, or a host of other design 
elements that embolden or lessen the 
emphasis. Similar to a modal qualifier 
used in language, visual modalities refer 




Luc Pauwels indicates that “inadequate 
resolution or insensitivity caused by a 
 
Any visual depiction that gives 
a viewer choices about what to 
see or where to go, as in a 
virtual simulation of a surgery, 
where the participant moves 
ambiguously through pre-
determined, technology-
restricted boundaries that limit 














Visual elements that draw 
particular attention over other 
elements, such as a yellow 
circle on a black background, 





Pixilation, jaggies, blurriness, 
incorrect color, and so forth 
that are present (because 
 
Elements of a visually 
simulated design that affect 
user experience—that please, 
anger, or frustrate—because of 


















Visual elements that draw 
particular attention over other 
elements, such as a yellow 
circle on a black background, 





Pixilation, jaggies, blurriness, 
incorrect color, and so forth 














































limited spectral range” of 
instrumentation can cause noise (9). 
Technological noise ambiguity refers to 
unnecessary, superfluous, or distracting 
visual elements created as a result of 
inferior technology.  
 
 
Rudolph Arnheim and Punyashloke 
Mishra have each mentioned that 
abstraction causes the viewer to mentally 
fill the blanks that the abstracted image 
leaves out. Scott McCloud has suggested 
that the more abstract an image is, the 
more people or things it can be said to 
represent. Abstraction ambiguity refers 
to images that remove realistic details to 
demonstrate either something 
incomprehensible (like in the Rorschach 
inkblot test) or to universalize a concept 
(like a stick figure for a human being). 
 
Mark Wolf, in “Subjunctive 
Documentary: Computer Imaging and 
Simulation” suggests that simulations 
are designed to show what a scenario 
“might be” like. Simulations are not 
always accurate, but they show a 
rendering of how we think something 
would or could be. Sometimes colors 
(and other design elements) are included 
in simulations—like to view the waves 
in an CAT scan or an MRI—to improve 
understanding but the waves are not 
actually colorful. Yet, the colorization 
allows the viewer to imagine what is 
happening, even though his eyes cannot 
view it naturally or without the help of 
instrumentation.   
 
With language, when describing a 
species or type, it is easy to indicate that 
there is a variance in the way something 
looks. (“A German Shepherd stands 
between 24 and 36 inches tall). However, 
in an image, as Luc Pauwels argues 
about representing a bird species, “one 
is…forced to show a particular 
specimen of the species…of a particular 
age and sex, and in particular 
circumstances (habitat, weather, time of 
day, season)” (14). Variance refers to 
static images produced by static 
technologies that represent only one 
archetype of a class of things that could 
be portrayed in multiple ways.  
 
technology inadequately 
captured a phenomenon’s true 
qualities) and affect 
readability—such as in a dark, 
black and white photo. 
 
 
Visual designs that, though 
technological manipulation, 
have been modified to be 
more visually simplistic, like in 
a diagram of a dragonfly where 
colors, shadows, etc. have 
been removed to enhance 







Visual elements conceptualized 
using technological 
applications (like Photoshop 
or animation software) to 
show something that the 
human eye would not have 
been able to see otherwise, 
making usability and 










A visual element that is 
representative of only one 
position, shape, species, size, 
etc. of an object that could 
likely be represented in other 
ways, like how the static image 
of an ant, shown from the 
side, climbing a tree could also 
be shown from the front, 
walking on a leaf. 
technology inadequately 
captured a phenomenon’s true 
qualities) and affect how a 
viewer feels about the scientific 
concept being represented. 
 
 
Visual designs that, though 
technological manipulation, 
have been modified to be 
more visually simplistic, like in 
a diagram of a dragonfly where 
colors, shadows, etc. have 
been removed, subsequently 
affecting emotive response to 
an image 
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The Metaphysical Domain of Visual Ambiguity 
Elements of an image or design that epistemologically affect meaning because of their 
connectedness to human character and personality fall within the metaphysical domain of 
visual ambiguity. W. J. T. Mitchell identifies gestalt psychology and Rorschach inkblots 
as idiosyncratic ways of interpreting information—individualistic interpretations affected 
by character, personal background, personality, and psychosis (Picture Theory). Roland 
Barthes has indicated that inexplicable visual elements, called punctums, will penetrate or 
“prick” an individual, distracting their attention to something unrelated to the message of 
the image (like a boy’s bad teeth in an image where a gun is pointed to the boy’s head) 
(Camera Lucida). Punctums remain outside of rhetoric because they are understood only 
idiosyncratically. Furthermore, in Fichte’s writings (as one example among many), we 
learn that human spirit and “productive imagination” have the ability to conjure images 
within our consciousness (203). Visual ambiguities of the metaphysical domain involve 
elements that spark unpredictable and individualistic reactions like gestalt switches or 
Barthes’ punctum, imagination, spiritual connection, or dreams. Types of visual 
ambiguities that can be found in the metaphysical domain may include those found in 






Table 4.4: The Metaphysical Domain of Visual Ambiguity 
 
 
Metaphysical Domain of Visual Ambiguity 
 
Visual ambiguities of this domain involve elements that spark unpredictable and individualistic reactions,  
imagination, gestalt switches, spiritual connection, and dreams.  
 
Metaphysical “Types”  



















































A concept primarily tied to the work of 
Roland Barthes, punctum refers to 
accidental “pricks” in an image or work 
of art that strikes the viewer in 
unexpected ways. Punctums cannot be 
planned by the communicator, but they 
nonetheless inflict new meaning on the 
viewer. Punctum ambiguities possess a 
somewhat uncanny ability to divert or 
distract the viewer from the message of 
the image. (Camera Lucida). 
 
Principles of Gestalt psychology 
indicate that the brain puts pieces 
together into whole, connecting 
dots that are not necessarily there, 
to understand how visual pieces 
work together. Gestalt switches 
happen the brain sees multiple 
things from these pieces at the same 
time, in what W. J. T. Mitchell has 
called “multistable” images. Gestalt-
switch ambiguity involves visual 
elements that collectively might be 
perceived as multiple things at the 
same time. 
 
The widely used Rorschach inkblot 
test uses abstract images to 
determine personality. In a similar 
vein, Rorshcach ambiguities exist in 
images where the viewer is unclear 
what an image represents in reality, 
and is hence required to simply 
suggest what it “looks like” to him 
or her 
 
Ficthe has suggested that the human 
spirit is the “ability of the 






























Elements of an image that 
appear too abstract—at least 
beyond the knowledge of the 
viewer—to be decipherable, 
and thus affect the usability of 
the image 
 
 Anything that is strikingly odd 
or that captures unsolicited 
attention to an individual 
viewer. Barthes uses the 
example of how in a photo of 
a young boy with a gun to his 
head, Barthes is distracted, for 





















Elements of an image that 
appear too abstract—at least 
beyond the knowledge of the 
viewer—to be decipherable. 
Because of this abstractness, 
viewer interprets the image to 
look like something that it is 
not, but something tied to his 
or her emotional response to 
the image  
 
Visual elements that affect the 
imagination in relation to 
personal experience, conjuring 











feelings into representations” (199). 
Spiritual ambiguities, thus, emerge 
from personal experiences and 
feelings where a viewer’s 
imagination pictures something that 
is not even present in the physical 
image.   
 
 
physical image. For example, a 
viewer may look at a close-up 
photograph of osteoporosis, 
but mentally picture something 
else, like a sponge, and then be 
“spiritually” reverted to a time 
when his/her parents found a 
live sponge on the beach.  
 
 
Developing a Naming System 
Beyond classification, the development of a naming system is the next logical step for a 
taxonomy of visual ambiguity. Sandra Knapp, author for the Natural History Museum in 
London, in a short anecdote about taxonomies noted that early problems with the naming 
of plants caused not only miscommunication but mistaken scientific function. The name 
of the tomato, for example, was translated into different Latin terms, including poma di 
Mori and poma di ori, meaning the “apple of the Moors” and the “golden apple,” 
respectively. It is believed that these names may have combined to be poma amoris, 
meaning the “love apple,” and that it was eventually suspected that the tomato was a 
powerful aphrodisiac. Perhaps just as problematic, if not worse, Knapp notes what later 
became the official Latin name of the tomato: Solanum caule inerni herbaceo, foliis 
pinnatis incises, “which means the ‘solanum with the smooth stem which is herbaceous 
and has pinnate leaves’” (Knapp). Just as multiple terms for the same item is overtly 
problematic, the lengthy names of scientific concepts also made it most certainly difficult 
to communicate coherently and effectively.    
 Perhaps obvious, the history of nomenclature in the sciences led to a pointed 
binomial naming system, most widely recognized as being developed by Carolus 
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Linnaeus in the 18
th
 century (even though binomial naming systems, really, can be dated 
back to Aristotle in his work Historia Animalium and later polished by his student 
Theophrastus in his categorization of plants) (Tilton). Linnaeus’ simple, systematic 
naming system transformed science with its simplicity and functionality. The genus > 
species system of nomenclature profoundly simplified terminology that in turn simplified 
and expedited scientific discourse. Cultural and communal shifts in the naming of plants 
and animals no longer hindered effective progress. The streamlining of the system in 
fields like botany and medicine was so effective that it has been used for nearly 250 
years.  
 To apply the effectiveness of naming systems to visual ambiguity, in the tables 
above I established a short taxonomic list of visual ambiguities as a sampling of how a 
naming system might work.  The taxonomy presented in the tables is far from 
exhaustive—indeed it merely scratches the surface—but it demonstrates the practical, 
systematic method in which scientific communicators might improve visual literacy 
through a simple naming process. In the preamble to the International Code of Botanical 
Nomenclature, it states the very perfunctory scope of an effective naming system:  
This Code aims at the provision of a stable method of naming taxonomic groups, 
avoiding and rejecting the use of names that may cause error or ambiguity or 
throw science into confusion. Next in importance is the avoidance of the useless 
creation of names. Other considerations, such as absolute grammatical 
correctness, regularity or euphony of names, more or less prevailing custom, 
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regard for persons, etc., notwithstanding their undeniable importance, are 
relatively accessory. (“Preamble”) 
The taxonomic descriptions above lists the types of visual ambiguity as they might be 
construed in such a mechanical fashion. Each of the domains and dimensions, as well as 
numerous types, of visual ambiguity is defined. The primary function of this portion of 
the taxonomy is to develop a series of definitions under which a viewer of a scientific 
representation could classify meaning-making phenomena they cognitively see or 
emotively experience. A viewer (and, obviously, the author) of an image, in other words, 
can take something they see in any image or design (a wavy line, a color, a little girl, a 
sponge, a pixilation), and categorize it under a specific class of ambiguous meaning-
making.   
 To illustrate, a person looking at a computer-produced image of a pixilated 
typeface might notice “jaggies” or “aliasing”—technical terms for wavy, stair step effects 
that show up on straight and curved lines due to low resolution screens or printouts. 
These jaggies might be identified under the type of visual ambiguity “noise” which 
further falls under the technological domain. Researchers, practitioners, or educators 
might then determine which of the meaning-making dimensions this design element most 
likely affects: cognitive or affective, or a combination of the two. To classify the 
ambiguity and its locus of effect on a particular visual design element, the person 
working with the image would label it in a trinomial nomenclature pattern, not unlike the 
Linnaean classification system, in this order: Domain > Dimension > Type. For example, 
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if the usability/readability of the image is affected by jaggies, the jaggies could be labeled 
as Technological-Cognitive-Noise ambiguities. If the viewer’s emotional response of the 
image is also affected by the jaggies, they could also be identified as Technological-
Affective-Noise ambiguities. Here, the ambiguity of the visual element is preserved—its 
name(s) do(es) not entirely define it because it can be classified under two names. Each 
name, though, specifies a point of focus. Scientific researchers, communicators, or 
educators may wish to evaluate the jaggies from either visual ambiguity name. The visual 
element remains the same, but its function, its ambiguity, changes. The potential, of 
course, of doing this is to provide researchers and practitioners with a guide and 
terminology for evaluating particular responses to images and designs while cognizant of 
the indeterminate.  
Ambiguous Relationships: A Tetradic Model 
The names and categorizations listed in the taxonomy above is helpful, but the productive 
application of a taxonomy for visual ambiguity must go one step further than naming and 
categorizing. It must, as I mentioned earlier, seek to bridge the divide between method 
and imagination, or science and rhetoric. As Kenneth Burke noted in A Grammar of 
Motives: “Accordingly, what we want is not terms that avoid ambiguity, but terms that 
clearly reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise” (xviii). Naming 
and categorizing visual ambiguities can only get scientific communicators so far—
recognizing their affect when they work in tandem with each other is far more productive 
(and even more ambiguous). A frequently proposed problem of taxonomies is that by 
categorizing parts of a larger system, we begin to assume that each category or type is 
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mutually exclusive, that there is no overlap. A taxonomy of any communication, be it 
linguistic or visual, would be problematic if we were to assume that each defined 
category were perfectly delineated. That would suggest an unalterably prescriptive 
definition of each area of visual ambiguity, which seems a superficial and inaccurate 
approach because it doesn’t embrace how types of visual ambiguity relate to each other. 
 In what might be deemed a taxonomy of rhetorical motives, Burke is widely 
known for the development of the dramatistic pentad, which establishes a systematic 
investigation into a “grammar” of rhetorical motives. This taxonomy has been 
extensively used to critically analyze anything from gay rights controversies (Brummet) 
to W. D. Hamilton’s work in genetic evolution (Journet). Burke’s five terms—“act,” 
“scene,” “agent,” “agency,” and “purpose”—serve as rhetorical categories which affect 
an event. The delineation of these terms effectively produces the “stage” whereby we can 
formulaically analyze human motives and actions. What I wish to emphasize here is that 
Burke suggests that awareness of the relationships between these categories is what 
strengthens analytical effectiveness. “Certain formal interrelationships prevail among 
these terms,” he says, “by reason of their role as attributes of a common ground or 
substance. Their participation in a common ground makes for transformability.” Perhaps 
even more importantly, Burke then continues: “At every point where the field covered by 
any one of these terms overlaps upon the field covered by any other, there is an alchemic 
opportunity, whereby we can put one philosophy or doctrine of motivation into the 
alembic, make the appropriate passes, and take out another” (xix). The reference to an 
alembic is particularly poignant, as it suggests that by developing relationships between 
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multiple categories, we refine our understanding about each.  
 The goal of a taxonomy like Burke’s is to point out specific areas from which we 
can work without pigeonholing or marginalizing any of them. A systemic categorization 
useful for analysis, such as Burke’s, recognizes that categories affect each other and that 
together they have a synoptic function, that they collectively extricate principle elements 
in order to make an educated generalization. In Burke’s words, a taxonomy like his 
methods of dramatism 
Offers of system of placement, and should enable us, by the systematic 
manipulation of the terms, to “generate,” or “anticipate” the various classes of 
motivational theory. And a treatment in these terms…reduces the subject 
synoptically while still permitting us to appreciate its scope and complexity. 
(xxiii)  
Burke’s purpose for using the pentadic terms was to produce a system whereby we would 
be able to conjure a synopsis of an event, evaluate the happenings or actions of that event 
as they relate to each point in the pentad, and predict future actions based on the causes of 
action identified in the “stage” under investigation. When we evaluate the possibilities 
that a “scene” (the background or situation in which an action takes place) provides, 
Burke suggests, we might be able to also determine how the act came to fruition. Thus, 
there is a relationship between the scene and the act, identified as the “scene-act ratio” 
(3). Burke points out that with his five terms, there are ten possible ratios: scene-act, 
scene-agent, scene-agency, scene-purpose, act-purpose, act-agent, act-agency, agent-
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purpose, agent-agency, and agency-purpose. These ratios provide insight into 
determining how actions come to pass. 
 In relation to a taxonomy of visual ambiguity, I propose not a pentad, but a tetrad, 
where the agent is removed from the ratios. Burke’s taxonomy of dramatistic terms was 
intended to investigate what moves people (“agents”) to action (“act”). Despite the fact 
that an agent commits the act, his or her motivations for doing so are not necessarily 
reliant upon him or her, and thus a rhetorical analysis of the motives can be explored 
without investigation of the agent. At least, motivations can be investigated from 
perspectives outside of the agent (a person might kill another person, but we may 
investigate it from the perspective of how the scene and purpose encouraged it). In other 
words, for an investigator to evaluate motives for actions caused by an agent, critical 
analysis using Burke’s pentad allows for the person conducting the analysis to remove 
the agent entirely from the analysis. Observation of why an act happened might simply be 
evaluated on circumstantial properties of the scene regardless of the agent’s role in it. The 
Tetradic Model of visual ambiguity differs from this in an important and somewhat 
paradoxical way. Rather than using the taxonomy to discover what moves people to 
action, it is intended to investigate what moves people to understanding. In this regard, 
the agent cannot be removed from analysis, and must be removed from the ratios. This is 
because the ratios that move a person to understanding will always be affected by the 
person’s (agent’s) idiosyncratic interpretation and, thus, intrinsically included in any 
analysis of the visually communicative ratios.  
 From a tetradic perspective, then, I propose that visual ambiguities function 
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within a visual “stage,” which actively contains dramatistic parallels to Burke’s terms. 
Burke’s terms seek to answer the five classic questions: who (agent), what (act), 
when/where (scene), how (agency), and why (purpose). If the agent is always necessary 
for effective analysis, then an investigator evaluates how the other four dramatistic terms 
impact understanding.  While Burke’s stage/drama metaphor is appropriate to predict and 
analyze the motives of human action, I prefer to use a slightly more visual metaphor for 
the analysis of visual representations’ effect on understanding, where the stage becomes 
the visual field, or a cinematic mise en scène, which describes the arrangement of scenery 
in a visual field. If the observer of a scientific communication is the agent, then we know 
who is being affected by the communication. The other four terms in question, 
appropriate to the mise en scene metaphor are as follows: 
1. Subject (what): the thing or things being communicated, the visual subject of 
a representation 
2. Scenery (where/when): the information that surrounds the subject, either 
directly within the visual field, or without 
3. Makeup (how): the ensemble of visual elements that collectively construct the 
subject and scenery 
4. Scope (why): the purpose of the representation in relation to the scientific 
phenomena it is intended to represent 
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The tetrad represented in the mise en scene of a scientific visualization represents the 
visually communicative components in play whenever a person observes the 
visualization. Visual ambiguities, specifically, become part of the scenery and makeup. 
The interpretation of any of the four parts of the tetrad is affected by how the agent 
responds to the visual ambiguities’ relationship with other parts. Just as we can use 
Burke’s pentadic ratios to determine motives for actions, we can assemble ratios of the 
tetradic mise en scene to determine possible reasons for interpretation. Analysis of the 
subject-scenery ratio, for example, investigates how the subject of a representation is 
communicatively affected by the scenery (which might include a “Linguistic/Rhetorical-
Cognitive-Juxtaposition” visual ambiguity) in relation to the agent’s interpretation of 
both. A heuristic investigation, using a case example, of how the tetrad might be applied 
to research and instruction is explained in Chapter 5. 
 
Ambiguous Conclusions about the Tetradic Model of Visual Ambiguity 
In sum, the taxonomy presented here is a convergence of method and rhetoric, designed 
to promote awareness into the epistemology of the scientific imagination as the 
imagination is shaped by visual representations. The categorizing and naming systems, 
drawn from Linnaeus and Bloom respectively, shape the methodical portion of the 
taxonomy. The tetradic model, adapted from Burke’s pentad, shape the rhetorical portion. 
Each of these portions work together as a holistic model for the interpretation of visual 
communication; however, each portion is, fittingly, wrought with ambiguities. 
 The categories developed, for example, are most certainly incomplete. Within 
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each of the four domains, there is assured overlap in definitional properties (or, Burke’s 
“antinomies of definition.”) A linguistic-rhetorical visual element, for instance, might be 
identified simultaneously as a socio-cultural element because, clearly, linguistic elements 
are inherently cultural. Additionally, it is conceivable that other domains of visual 
ambiguity (beyond the four presented in the pinwheel at the onset of this chapter) may be 
conjured. The dimensions, too, are limiting and incomplete. In fact, Bloom felt it 
necessary to include a third dimension of learning altogether in his taxonomy (though, in 
his, it was labeled a “domain”): the psychomotor. For the purposes of visual 
communication and the improvement of visual literacy, affective and cognitive 
interpretations seemed the most poignant for this discussion and are the only two I 
included in the taxonomy. However, the physical, psychomotor components of meaning 
making could—and probably should—be investigated as well.  
 The rhetorical component of the taxonomy further obfuscates the clarity drawn 
from the classified and named visual ambiguities because it suggests that any 
named/classified visual element has the ability to affect meaning from multiple rhetorical 
perspectives (visual elements can, after all, shape-shift between subject, scenery, makeup, 
and scope). Ironically, however, the ambiguities of this taxonomy might be seen as its 
greatest strength because they provide nuanced flexibility for understanding how 
understanding is made. The taxonomy, in other words, through ambiguity, provides the 
practical wisdom of method for the sake of usefulness and application while 
appropriating artistic adaptation for the sake of imagination. As such, a more appropriate 
diagram of the taxonomy established in this chapter looks something like the 
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representation in Figure 4.2 below, where boundaries become blurred between 
dimensions, domains can be rotated to include different types, types “float” to move 
between dimensions and domains, and ratios of the tetradic mise en scene can be 
temporarily applied to any component of the taxonomy, much like a dart would be stuck 
to and removed from a dartboard.   
 
Figure 4.2: The Tetradic Model of Visual Ambiguity 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AMBIGUOUS HEURISTICS: A TETRADIC CASE ANALYSIS 
 
“For apart from inquiry, apart from the praxis, individuals cannot be truly human.
 Knowledge emerges only through invention and re-invention, through the restless,
 impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry human beings pursue in the world, with the
 world, and with each other.”  
 
    -Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
 
Back to Literacy: An Ambiguous Proposal 
The preceding chapters of this dissertation have been written in response to one primarily 
looming issue in scientific communication: a hope for a stronger visual literacy has been 
subdued by a historical resistance to ambiguity in the sciences. The epistemic 
conundrum, as proposed, is that despite aesthetics’ role as a nearly inescapable 
component of visual imagery, science, considered broadly as an area of inquiry, often 
expects visual representations to be productively mimetic of empirically drawn data. The 
ambiguity, however, that emerges in most or all visual representations—as discussed 
throughout this text—has been widely ignored as an inescapable, functional, and even 
productive part of scientific communication. In fact, visual ambiguity, if addressed at all, 
has frequently been deemed a hindrance to scientific communication (the efforts of 
instructional communication research to eradicate ambiguity in textbook representations 
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addressed in the opening chapter is evidence of this).    
 Adopting ambiguity as a normal and expected component of visual 
representations reframes the way we approach visual literacy in the sciences. Inserting 
visual ambiguity into the conversations about ethically and appropriately representing 
science, likewise, brings to the forefront the visual literacy skills that seem to often elude 
scientific communicators. Roald Hoffmann’s admonition to chemists about the lack of 
scientists’ skills in visually representing information might be broadly applied to 
scientific communicators in many fields:  “The group of professionals to whom this 
visual, three-dimensional information [graphical representations of science] is essential 
are not talented (any more, any less than the average person) at transmitting such 
information” (69). Hoffmann suggests that without training, scientists can—and will—
still communicate visually. There will just be “much more ambiguity than [they] think 
there is” (69). … The process,” he says, “is representation, a symbolic transformation of 
reality. It is both graphic and linguistic. It has a historicity. It is artistic and scientific” 
(69). Despite ambiguities functioning as a normal and inevitable part of the science and 
art of scientific communication, acquiring skills to work effectively within the 
communicative dichotomy will be challenging without awareness of how such 
ambiguities work. The Tetradic Model of Visual Ambiguity does not provide a clear-cut 
answer to how aesthetics, art, and design impact understanding. But it is not intended to. 
It is not the visual equivalent of an encyclopedic catalogue of a visual representation’s 
effects on meaning. Communication is, after all, far too complex for such a prosaic 
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rubric. The Tetradic Model functions as an adaptable, and perhaps richer, heuristic for 
strengthening awareness and the “talent” that Hoffmann refers to. 
Etymologically, heuristic finds its roots in the Greek ideas of discovery, 
inventing, and finding. The Tetradic Model moves towards this concept of heuristic—that 
is, it gives scientific communicators a rudimentary toolkit for discovering, inventing, and 
finding ways to improve visual communication in science. Thea Van Der Geest and Jan 
Spyridakis suggest that the real value of a heuristic is that it provides procedures that 
systematically move a person or group of people toward a discovery, decision, or 
solution. Further, and perhaps more importantly, they claim that heuristics are valuable 
especially when there is not a clear-cut right way of approaching problems, when 
multiple solutions are possible (301). The visceral nature of visual communication and 
the presence of affectively-charged visual rhetoric in scientific representations (which 
unavoidably capture at least some emotion or nuanced character trait of the viewer) 
suggest that a multiplicity of communicative interpretations will likely be inevitable and 
should be expected.  
A heuristic of visual communication, then, should not be intended to serve as a 
problem-solving mechanism, but as a problem-approaching iteration (and by “iteration,” 
I mean a recurring, solution-seeking method). In mathematics, “iteration” suggests 
repetition and succession of imprecise conclusions in order to arrive at the best or “most” 
accurate one. This type of iteration has also been labeled as a “successive 
approximation,” a concept that encourages repeated estimates, building upon previous 
ones in order to achieve a desired degree of accuracy. As Callahan et al suggested in their 
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Calculus in Context project: the method of successive approximation “builds succession 
of better and better estimates that get us as close as we wish to the true values” (61). 
Approaching visual communication from the perspective of an iterative heuristic 
encourages not necessarily the precise use and awareness of the communication’s 
ambiguity in order to reach understanding; rather, the proposed heuristic encourages 
visual literacy through successive, iterative appropriations of visual ambiguity until 
“desired degrees” of literate awareness of meaning-making are achieved. Epistemological 
ambiguities that exist in scientific representations—because of the categorical and 
imbricating domains of visual elements—offers the visual communicator no clear 
strategic plan for communicating with precision. For the communicator, there are only 
visually communicative options wrought with communicatively ambiguous projections. 
Hence, to improve visual literacy in the sciences types, dimensions, and domains of visual 
ambiguities can be (paradoxically) procedurally applied to a system of approximations 
where visual ambiguities can be better understood (though never precisely) as they relate 
to the complexities of context and human nature. 
 The rhetorical, Tetradic Model of Visual Ambiguity, then, intentionally wrought 
with ambiguous application, serves as a loosely formulaic approach for recognizing how 
art (even if unintentionally artistic) and the ambiguity that comes with it, 
epistemologically informs science, and vice versa. Visual literacy, it might be said, 
emerges from this recognition; if this is the case, bridging where art and science overlap 
in visual representations becomes an important, necessary skill for any scientific 
communicator. Paul Messaris, in his book Visual Literacy: Image, Mind, and Reality, 
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provides insight into how we might approach visual literacy. He has argued that visual 
literacy is 1) an attempt to acquire “familiarity with visual conventions…through 
cumulative exposure to the visual media”; that visual literacy 2) means garnering an 
“awareness of visual manipulation”; and that 3) visual literacy is a “basis for informed 
aesthetic appreciation” (3). My hope in presenting the taxonomy is that each of these 
components—familiarity, awareness, and appreciation—of visual communication in the 
sciences emerges from application of the Tetradic Model.  Familiarity and awareness, it 
would seem, come from systemization and repetition, which can emerge in scientific 
fields through naming and categorizing visual ambiguities. Appreciation, particularly of 
aesthetics and visual design elements, comes from “getting to know” how the elements 
relate to each other and how their “relationships” evolve or dissolve in differing 
communicative circumstance. Messaris indicated the importance of becoming aware of 
how “visual effects” work in representations, suggesting that “such knowledge is self-
evidently a prerequisite for the evaluation of artistic skill” (3). Knowledge of ambiguity’s 
influence, similar to that of Messaris’s “visual effects,” sheds light into how epistemic, 
visual meanings are derived; this knowledge, hence, might be viewed as a precursor to 
effective evaluation of the visual communication of science. 
 
The Tetradic Model and the Taxonomy: How They Work 
The Tetradic Model of Visual Ambiguity (and the taxonomic wheel within it) introduced 
in the previous chapter (see Figure 5.1) thus become part of a heuristic toolkit for 
conducting a tetradic analysis of the visual representations of science. 
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Figure 5.1: Taxonomic Wheel and Tetradic Model of Visual Ambiguity 
 
Using this taxonomic wheel, a scientific communicator can take a visual element, assign 
it a type that has been defined and categorized into a given dimension and domain, and 
then analyze that type from the perspective of any of the six Tetradic ratios (which are 
represented above as darts that can be “attached” to any of the domains and dimensions 
within the wheel). Tetradic analysis of a visual representation of science, using this 
taxonomic wheel, thus opens windows into the ways in which socio-cultural, linguistic-
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rhetorical, technological, and metaphysical ambiguities affect meaning-making in 
scientific communication.  
Thus application of the heuristic as a means for discerning communicative effects 
on viewers means distinguishing first between science as it exists in the mind and science 
as it exists materially. Qualitative investigations would use the Tetradic Model to explore 
how visual elements rhetorically, perhaps metaphysically, create an idiosyncratically 
mental understanding of scientific phenomena. Quantitative uses of the Tetradic Model, 
conversely, would explore how concretized and defined material scientific phenomena 
are cognitively understood across a more generalized viewing audience. The difference 
between the two might be best understood from the perspective of Cartesian dualism and 
materialism. Descartes argued that consciousness defined reality. Materialists argue that 
matter and energy define reality. Visual ambiguities can be explored from either of these 
two perspectives: either as an entity within consciousness that helps shape idiosyncratic 
(qualitative) awareness of scientific phenomena outside of the physical world, or as a 
physical entity that disrupts or distorts cognitive (quantitative) interpretation of materially 
existent scientific phenomena.     
 
Case Analysis: Image, Taxonomy, Tetrad, and Ratios   
The subsequent pages of this chapter investigate how we might utilize the Tetradic Model 
from Chapter 4 to conduct a “Tetradic Analysis of visual ambiguity” of a visual 
representation of science. In effect, the following Tetradic Analysis provides an example 
of how scientific communicators might make use of the taxonomy to strengthen 
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awareness of how science and art work in tandem to produce meaning. Thus the bulk of 
this chapter serves as an ambiguous heuristic—that is, it provides a series of 
“suggestions” for improving visual literacy by creating familiarization, awareness, and 
appreciation of the visual ambiguities that help shape meaning.  
 
The Image: “Osteoporosis” 
To highlight the exigency that underlies literate awareness of visual ambiguities in 
scientrific representations, we may consider just how visual elements epistemologically 
shape our understanding. One such example is a conceptualized image of osteoporosis, a 
photo taken and edited by photomicroscopy specialist and natural science photographer 
Norman Barker (see Figure 5.2).  
 
Figure 5.2: Norman Barker's "Osteoporosis" 
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In this image, viewer’s see a “spongy,” “lacelike,” “network of interconnected spicules” 
enhanced and enlarged to show texture and form (Chin 23).  The image is of a woman’s 
bone diagnosed with osteoporosis, but the image stylistically appears like an amalgam of 
intricately woven fabric or a close-up of a delicate sea creature. This image persuasively, 
epistemologically “instructs” the viewer as they piece together what it is intended to 
communicate. It is likely hard for any viewer not to say to him or herself, as he or she 
gawks at the fascinating design, “oh, wow, osteoporosis looks like that?” Despite the 
caption superimposing a portion of the image that reads “using new software tools, 
[Barker] stitched multiple images together to create an unlimited depth of focus,” viewers 
will likely take this image (at least upon first glance) at face value, to be the visual 
definition, the truthfully factual depiction, of a cancellous, osteoporosis-stricken femur 
(23, italics mine). Like the images of cells in the BioVisions project, this image of 
osteoporosis is grounded in scientific procedure, but influenced by technology, human 
decision-making, artistic flare, and production/dissemination methods. This image is a 
“metapicture,” as Mitchell has suggested, a “place where pictures reveal and know 
themselves, where they reflect on the intersections of visuality, language, and similitude” 
(82). In other words, it is an image that, despite its seeming simplicity, complexly 
communicates multiple things at once. Visual ambiguities exist in this composite image 
that displays natural beauty from an unnatural composition process.  
 The “stitching” of images with software tools has become an inescapable part of 
the scientific process or, at least, the communicating of it. Barker’s image of 
osteoporosis, as a common example of visualized scientific communication, is at once 
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instructive and clear, and also conceptualized, artistic, and ambiguos. Barker’s 
“Osteoporosis” only shows one part of one woman’s bone; it is greatly enlarged (like the 
foodstuffs on the cover of a cereal box) to show texture; and it has artfully removed 
noise, color, and other unwanted visual “material” in order to highlight key elements and 
to beautify the image. And, despite the advancement in imaging technology, the image is 
still affected by the lighting, angle, shutter speed, and so forth in the technology—the 
photographic device—that captured it.  
 Barker’s image, while certainly aesthetically attractive, is nothing exceptionally 
dramatic or fanciful in its depiction; it serves, however, as a good example of how 
aesthetics in scientific representation affect understanding and why we might look to 
visual ambiguity to strengthen our familiarity, awareness, and appreciation of the 
epistemic qualities of visual elements. Barker’s image is representative of a particularly 
common medical photograph, an image that could be displayed in a popular science 
magazine (like Scientific American, where I first came across it), or in a textbook, 
journal, or museum (places where many others of Barker’s similar images have been 
published). Like many visual representations of science, it has been photo-edited and 
rendered for a number of reasons, not the least of which is for “readability.” But the 
caption atop the image, which touts the stitching of images, describes the possible 
misunderstanding of how art and science—and ambiguity—work simultaneously within 
an image. This caption, perhaps, is representative of the visual literacy problem: it points 
to the clarity that artistic rendering provides, and does not consider the ambiguity that 
emerges from such rendering. “Osteoporosis,” we might say, is prototypical of the kinds 
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of images in science that amalgamate artistic aesthetics and scientific rigor. It is an 
image, like so many others, ripe with visual ambiguities that frame interpretation and 
there is much that can be gleaned from evaluating the role of visual ambiguity within it. 
 
The Taxonomy: Types, Domains, and Dimensions 
Duotone as a “Type” of Visual Ambiguity 
In every scientific representation, there are visual elements that communicate something. 
In Barker’s representation of a human bone, a duotone color scheme with a sepia hue is 
used to highlight particular features. The duotone itself is a visual element within the 
image (and is one of possibly scores of visual elements that could be investigated). Like 
most other visual elements in any image, the duotone in this image has the ability to 
produce multiple understandings and interpretations, even if subtle. The duotone is, in 
other words, a type of visual ambiguity. A visual element’s type emerges as the scientific 
communicator reflects on how the element conveys ambiguous meaning. A type listed 
and defined in the taxonomy in Chapter 4 that is appropriate to the visual element, 
duotone, under investigation is “modality.” According to the definition listed in the 
taxonomy, a “modality” type may be defined as a visual element that  
 
“embolden[s] or lessen[s] … emphasis. Similar to a modal qualifier used in 




Because the duotone highlights and obscures—emboldens and lessens emphasis—we 
might label the duotone in “Osteoporosis” as a “modality.” 
 
Duotone within the Cognitive Dimension 
Furthermore, the duotone of this image, undoubtedly, might directly affect both the 
cognitive components of meaning-making and the affective components. Analysis of the 
duotone spurs questions about which meaning-making dimension—cognitive or 
affective—it should fall under. Does the visual element directly affect readability or 
usability? Or, does the element affect emotional response?  For the analysis of 
“Osteoporosis,” I opted to evaluate the element from the perspective of the cognitive 
dimension (not necessarily because the duotone is more prevalent in this area, but simply 
because one had to be chosen for analysis). Because the duotone contains characteristics 
that would likely affect readability (cognition), the duotone in this image might be said to 
lie within the “cognitive” dimension and be labeled as a “modality” type. 
 
Duotone within the Technological Domain 
Placing the duotone within a domain further raises questions about the characteristics that 
inform the dimension it is in. Does the duotone have a particular history within a 
discipline (socio-historical domain)? Might the duotone evoke personal reflections 
unrelated to the science itself (metaphysical domain)? Is there a particularly close 
relationship with the duotone and something linguistic (linguistic-rhetorical domain)? 
Answers to such questions assign the duotone, as a type of visual ambiguity, within a 
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domain particularly relevant to specific research questions. Because the image editing 
and coloring in Barker’s image can be seen as technological superimpositions, the 
duotone in this analysis was said to be influenced by the “technological” domain of visual 
ambiguity.  
 The duotone in Barker’s “Osteoporosis” was thus be labeled a Technological-
Cognitive-Modality ambiguity (see Figure 5.3).  
 




This is not to say that the duotone could not have been labeled as something else entirely, 
however (and hence preserving the productive ambiguity of the taxonomy). Indeed, the 
duotone is tied to particular social histories as well; a viewer may reflect on his or her 
own affective perceptions of the sepia coloring as it relates to a history of its use or 
development. In this case, a researcher may wish to label the duotone differently, as a 
Socio/Cultural-Affective-History ambiguity. And, there are a number of other ways a 
researcher might be able to label the visual ambiguity present in this element. For the 
purposes of my investigation hereafter, the visual element duotone was analyzed as a 
Technological-Cognitive-Ambiguity. 
 
The Tetrad: Subject, Scenery, Makeup, and Scope  
The tetradic parts of the mise en scéne described in the previous chapter—the subject, 
scenery, makeup, and scope—further serve as communicative variables that contextualize 
the ambiguities that are defined and drawn from the taxonomy. For my analysis, the mise 
en scéne thus function as a rhetorical framework in which I was able contextualize the 
duotone. Like any visual representation of science, “Osteoporosis” as I found it was 
presented as a visual representation in a much broader mise en scéne. My scope, using the 
Tetradic Model, was to draw conclusions (or, at least, raise more questions) about how 
the duotone, in its broader rhetorical context, may shape meaning. In other words, how 
does the visual situation in which the duotone is placed affect understanding beyond the 




Most representations of science will exhibit some primary subject that is intended as the 
focal point that is intended to draw the viewer’s attention. This subject is supposed to 
reflect (or visually mimic in some way) the actual scientific phenomena it represents, 
even if said subject is widely abstracted or conceptualized. In “Osteoporosis,” the subject 
(as defined within the Tetradic Model) of the image is the bone itself (or, at least, the 
parts of the bone that we see).  
 
The Scenery 
The scenery is shaped by where the image is physically found, such as in a publication or 
as a photo in a lab. Also according to the Tetradic Model, the scenery includes any and 
all text and visuals that are in juxtaposition or circumnavigation of the image in the visual 
field in which it is found. For our example, “Osteoporosis” was located in the pages of 
Scientific American, a popular science magazine. The image had no article associated 
with it, though a small caption in a black textbox superimposed the image. Also within 
the scenery, seemingly unrelated advertisements surrounded the image and a short article 
on treating Tourette’s sundrome was adjacent to it.  
 
The Makeup 
According to the Tetradic Model, the makeup consists of the collection of visual “pieces” 
that jointly construct the subject and its surrounding environment. If the scenery is said to 
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be the collection of information surrounding the image, the makeup can be said to be the 
collection of information within the image. In complex (and perhaps “busy”) 
representations of science, like in Da Vinci’s drawing of the fetus in a womb, we see a 
host of things that make up the subject, including the fetus’s toes, the layers of the womb, 
the blood vessels attached to the womb, and so forth.  In “Osteoporosis,” the visual 
“pieces” that construct the subject appear to be minimal, though we can see a network of 
spicules that we are expected to interpret as the bone.  
 
The Scope 
Finally,  in the Tetradic Model the scope determines why the representation was made 
and what it was intended to represent. The scope may be one of the most challenging 
components of the Tetradto uncover, without knowing the person or organization that 
produced the image. However, a scope can often be inferred by textual cues in 
juxtaposition with the image, or by simply evaluating the likely scope based on the 
scenery in which the representation was produced. In the caption in Scientific American, 
the scope of “Osteoporosis” is explained as a way to expose “an unlimited depth of 
focus” on the far-reaching effects of the disease. The audience for whom this image has 
been produced (which for “Osteoporosis,” in Scientific American, might be considered a 
high-school-educated, science-interested, but non-expert audience) would also be 
determined within the scope.    
The purpose of appropriating the Tetradic Model to analyze an image like 
“Osteoporosis” was to determine which of the four parts of the mise en scène revealed the 
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most interesting rhetorical nuances. Indeed, it is here where visual literacy was improved 
as evaluation of context emerged. As I evaluated “Osteoporosis,” each of the four parts of 
the Tetrad revealed something interesting to me. The most difficult component of the 
Tetrad for me to evaluate, based on my background in medicine (which is very little), 
was the makeup. Because of my (in)experience, I was led to believe that the makeup of 
the image was mostly rhetorically interesting for what was left out of the image. The 
image makeup itself, from my perspective, did not offer much in terms of evaluation. Of 
course, experts in osteology, orthopedics, or even medical photography would likely 
disagree. For experts in those areas, there may be a host of rhetorical nuances exposed in 
the makeup of the “Osteoporosis” image. Such differences in the rhetorical purviews of 
the makeup between audiences expose the epistemic nuances that shift based on audience 
knowledge of the subject matter being communicated. The multiplicity (ambiguity) of 
rhetorical projections that emerge from the makeup of this image address Boyd’s 
perspective on epistemic access. Background knowledge of the subject and the makeup of 
that subject will provide varying levels of epistemic access to osteoporosis. As a viewer 
of the image, I become the agent that was affected by the communication and my ability 
to access, epistemically, the communicative nuances of the image depended on my 
individual, idiosyncratic experiences with such images and with such scientific 
phenomena. As the agent being moved to understanding, then, my interpretation was 




The Ratios: A Rhetorical Approach 
With this in mind, I evaluated the duotone as a visually ambiguous design choice that 
needed to be evaluated from some or all of the four parts of the Tetrad. Questions that 
were raised included: How does the duotone affect the subject in relation to how the 
viewer previously understood the subject? Would the duotone be more or less appropriate 
for the viewer amidst different scenery? If the scope were different, should the color 
scheme be as well? Such questions encouraged critical analysis of how visually 
contextual elements shape the meaning drawn from a representation.  
 The communicative power of visual ambiguity can be best understood as we 
complicate the Tetrad by establishing ratios, as Burke did with his pentad.  To illustrate 
just how the Tetradic Model was used to critically examine the rhetorical influence of 
visual ambiguity in “Osteoporosis,” attention may be drawn to a particularly relevant 
rhetorical analysis by Debra Journet. In “Metaphor, Ambiguity, and Motive in 
Evolutionary Biology,” Journet uses Burke’s pentad to critically examine textual 
ambiguities in the scientific writing of evolutionary biologist W.D. Hamilton. Conducting 
a close reading of Hamilton’s work on genes, Journet uses the pentad to uncover the 
epistemological effects of using ambiguous metaphors about genes to describe their 
functionality. Journet suggests that evaluation of Hamilton’s writing exposes numerous 
instances where metaphors of motives given to genes (where the gene “struggles,” or 
“adapts,” or “behaves selfishly”) shape scientists’ understanding of how genes work. 
Specifically, Journet argues,that Hamilton’s writing identifies the gene as an agent and an 
agency. She states: 
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The metaphorical language of motive [in Hamilton’s writings], what I also call a 
“grammar of selfishness,” allows Hamilton to represent genes ambiguously and 
simultaneously (often in the same sentence) as both the agents of evolutionary 
action and as the agency or mechanism by which organism agents act. The 
difference between these two ways of understanding evolutionary processes is not 
trivial, as ongoing controversy in biology suggests. Instead, the textual ambiguity 
generated by the grammar of selfishness both reflects and constructs a conceptual 
ambiguity in the way evolutionary processes are theorized. (380) 
 
Journet’s scope was to uncover how textual metaphors, or ambiguities, in Hamilton’s 
writing rhetorically—and hence epistemologically—gave agency to an object of inquiry, 
the gene. She used the agent-agency ratio drawn from Burke’s pentad to determine the 
extent and effect of assigning such roles to genes. Drawing from her rhetorical analysis of 
how Hamilton’s terminology shapes the function of the gene, she further concludes: 
 
Insofar as evolutionary theory is constructed from a “gene’s point of view,” it is a 
story of selfish gene-agents acting to ensure their own continued existence, even 
at the expense of the organism by whose agency they survive. But insofar as 
evolution is constructed from the organism’s point of view, it recounts a story of 
selfish organisms or agents who, by using their gene-agency, act in ways that 
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allow them to maximize their own inclusive fitness. These narratives are perhaps 
complementary but not identical. (408) 
 
What we see in Journet’s analysis is the appropriation of pentadic ratios to gene theory as 
it is explained in Hamilton’s text. Ambiguities—in this case textual metaphors for how 
genes behave—are assigned to parts of the pentad to garner insight into how the 
ambiguities epistemologically encourage scientists to think about genes. Journet’s close 
reading and rhetorical analysis through the pentad allows us to compare and contrast how 
textual ambiguities frame genes and, in essence, reconfigure theories of evolution. 
“Evolution seen from the perspective of the organism results in one story; but re-seen 
from the gene’s point of view, its meaning is transformed” (407). 
 Using the Tetrad, we can draw similar conclusions about visual ambiguities, 
though perhaps not always as drastic as what Journet uncovered in Hamilton’s writings. 
Generally speaking, when a visual ambiguity becomes labeled and visually understood as 
a certain part of the Tetrad, that label uncovers particular epistemological understandings. 
For example, when the duotone was viewed from the lens of the subject, the human bone 
(and osteoporosis) became interpreted as dichromatic, simplified, no doubt, from its 
“natural” state. In other words, representation of osteoporosis with a duotone may 
(depending on the background of the viewer) epistemologically encourage scientists (or, 
more likely in this case, a non-expert audience) to perceive the ailment from a 
reductionist perspective. Even more revealing, however, is when a ratio between two 
parts of the Tetrad is established. 
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 When, for example, the duotone in “Osteoporosis” was evaluated from a subject-
scenery ratio (depicted as one of the six darts in Figure 5.3 above), the visual ambiguity 
was represented as also inclusive of the location (scenery) in which it was found. When 
in the Tetrad the duotone became part subject and part scenery, I could draw conclusions 
about its epistemological range within the visual communication in terms of how it 
ambiguously represented the scientific subject and the audience for whom it was 
published. When the duotone was represented as a quality of the subject (which is an 
osteoporosis-stricken bone) and when the duotone was visually displayed within a unique 
scenery (a popular science magazine, surrounded by captions and advertisements), it was 
learned that the subject of the representation may epistemologically become understood 
as dichromatic and simplified to the audience. Questions that surfaced as the duotone was 
evaluated from the subject-scenery ratio included: To what extent is the duotone expected 
to be viewed as mimetic to the actual object that it signifies? To what extent is the 
duotone represented as such to accommodate an audience? Is the subject represented as 
duotone for publication purposes (to save money), for aesthetic purposes (to enhance 
appeal), or for accuracy purposes (to instruct)?  
 With the four parts of the Tetrad, six ratios may be established—subject-scenery, 
subject-makeup, subject-scope, scenery-makeup, scenery-scope, and makeup-scope. 
Analysis from each of these ratios can, ambiguously but in productive ways, shed light on 
the epistemic weight—and perhaps even communicative prowess—of visual elements. 
Journet suggested that textual ambiguities are essential to understanding scientific 
concepts. “My analysis [of Hamilton’s writing] … ,” she says, “emphasizes the 
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productive, even necessary, function of ambiguity. … I believe that it is the very 
possibility of ambiguity that helps make the text so powerful” (381). I likewise believe 
that ambiguity in visual representations is necessary and productive; analysis through 
ratios exposes new and important ways in which it is such.   
 
From Ratios to Research: A Discussion 
The ubiquity of ambiguity in any given visual element is once again shown in the 
multiplicity of types by which any visual element may be named. The taxonomy, though, 
as an amorphous structure for naming and cataloguing types within disciplines, provides 
a more pointed perspective for research. Specific research questions can be drawn just 
from the naming of the visual element under investigation. If, for instance, a researcher 
labels the duotone as a Technological-Cognitive-Modality ambiguity, he or she can draw 
research questions around the technology that produced the image, how well the viewer is 
able to cognitively process what he or she is looking at, and how those particular colors 
modally highlight and obscure precise components of the image. The research questions 
developed for this type of visual ambiguity would likely take on a material, usability-
based approach to understanding viewer effect. It is, after all, labeled within the cognitive 
dimension. If the type of ambiguity associated with this visual element were to be 
investigated from the affective dimension, the research questions would, obviously, shift 
significantly, focusing more on qualitative, idiosyncratic meaning-making experiences.  
 In Composition Research: Empirical Designs, Lauer and Asher suggest that 
qualitative research studies such as case studies, ethnographies, and sampling and 
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surveying are used to “generate variables, to operationally define them, and to develop 
early understandings of their interrelationships” (82). Drawing from the taxonomy, 
researchers and educators should be able to position scientific representations within 
scholarly contexts in order to determine some of the more profound, important, and 
anomalous instances of visual ambiguity affecting the viewer’s response and meaning-
making. Initially, the idea would not be to, as Lauer and Asher further suggest, “establish 
cause-and-effect relationships among variables; [this kind of qualitative research] seldom 
has that kind of explicit power” (23). Rather, the idea ought to be focusing a research 
design around a specific type or dimension of visual ambiguity in order to raise 
awareness, to identify important variables, and to, in the types of ambiguity where it 
seems feasible, establish interrelationships between variables in order to set up quasi and 
true quantitative research designs.  
 To illustrate, a researcher who wishes to investigate the communicative 
effectiveness of the duotone and labels this visual element as Technological-Cognitive-
Modality, may develop research questions such as the following: 
 
What features of the image are viewers most drawn to? How does this change 
when the duotone changes to a cyan or magenta hue? How does the duotone—as 
opposed to the “natural” colors of the bone—affect an orthopedic surgeon’s 
ability to give an accurate prognosis? Does he or she seem to place emphasis on 
a particular part of the image as a duotone rather than full color image? 
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But while these questions are good introductory inquiries into the 
communicativeness of the visual element, such questions remain superficial and static 
without context. As Wysocki argued in “The Sticky Embrace of Beauty,” when we look 
simply at visual elements’ acute effects solely within the frame of the image under 
investigation, content somehow gets sidestepped in favor of form.  Investigation of the 
type of visual ambiguity as it relates to the broader mise en scéne—within which the 
formal elements of the representation plays only one small part in meaning-making—
raises important questions about how an image and its visual parts always emerge out of 
broader contexts. Simply labeling visual elements and establishing research questions 
based on those labels, after all, is not much different than traditional research processes 
that seek to define variables (though the taxonomy does provide a space in which 
disciplines might make the defining and use of more replicable and somewhat 
standardized). While interesting and appropriate research can be drawn by locating and 
labeling visual ambiguities only, rich and valuable understandings about the 
communication of visual elements further emerge by establishing how they function 
rhetorically within larger communicative scopes. The rhetorical contexts are much harder 
to quantify, of course, but that does not make them any less valuable. 
Rhetorical analysis of the ratios also? provides a close “reading” of visual elements. It 
provides a means by which we may evaluate large quantities of images across media or 
several visual ambiguities within one particular representation. Journet evaluated several 
terms and metaphors within two separate documents written by Hamilton. Researchers 
investigating visual representations of science may similarly wish to look at several 
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visual ambiguity types within one image or representation, such as Barker’s 
“Osteoporosis.” Or, they may wish to evaluate one visual ambiguity type in several 
different related visual representations (like a series of images published in different 
venues). Either way, a Tetradic Analysis of visual ambiguity using ratios exposes 
communicative influence found across visual texts. The Tetradic ratios do not, however, 
glean particular insight into how individuals idiosyncratically react to visual elements.  
Perhaps for more quantitative measures, if a researcher (who is interested how visual 
communication distorts or alters the materiality of science) wants to know how the 
duotone affects the way in which a viewer actually perceives osteoporosis after viewing a 
representation, initial questions to the viewer, in a sampling-surveying research design, 
would focus around each domain, dimension, and type (which would be Technological-
Cognitive-Modality in our example).  The researcher would be reliant upon the definition 
of each domain, dimension, and type as it is accepted in his or her discipline to generate 
questions. Sample questions to research participants, then, might look something like 
this: 
1) After viewing the image, what color would you imagine a “live” case of 
osteoporosis in a human bone to look like? (Note that the researcher, with this 
question, looks for cognitive interpretation of the ‘color’ of the image, drawing 
the question from the technological domain and cognitive dimension, as outlined 
in Chapter 4.)  
2) After viewing the image, how large would you imagine are the gaps, or holes, in 
the bone in a typical case of osteoporosis? (Note that the researcher, with this 
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question, looks for cognitive interpretation of the ‘magnitude’ of the image, 
drawing the question from the technological domain and cognitive dimension.)  
3) From your perspective, what is emphasized most in the image? (Note that here, 
the researcher uses the term ‘emphasis’ from the definition of ‘modality’.) 
Research in the social sciences (as opposed, perhaps, to the natural sciences) is reliant 
upon, in many ways, ambiguous research designs. This is not a derogatory statement. 
What often separates the “hard sciences” from those of the “soft” is perceived in levels of 
quantifiability. The former is perceived as knowable science through replicable, strict, 
and accurate measures—something a researcher can attach a numerical value to; the latter 
is perceived as knowable science as well, but only through the nuanced lenses of human 
emotion and idiosyncrasy. The hard sciences are not typically faced with research 
questions that deal with a high level of human interpretation. Much of what we learn 
about human experience (whether it be about how a person views himself as being 
victimized, his attitude toward products, or his perceived level of fear, and so forth) is 
through questioning. And, in an arguably qualitative, ambiguous process for 
measurement, those being researched often provide interpretable, adjustable responses. 
Even standardized Likert scales provide respondents opportunity for multiple potential 
responses. As Floyd J. Flower noted of social science research: 
 
There is an almost limitless body of desirable and useful information that can be 
gathered only by asking people questions. In some cases, that is because we want 
to know facts that are difficult to observe systematically…. We also are often 
 137 
interested in measuring phenomena that only individuals themselves can perceive: 
what people think or know, or what they feel. (1)  
 
For those who wish to attempt the quantifying of visual ambiguity’s epistemic influence, 
perhaps one of the most feasible research designs using a taxonomy of visual ambiguity 
is sampling and surveying. To recognize the frequency and effect of representations in a 
genre of scientific communication (such as scientific photographs in popular trade 
magazines like Scientific American or American Scientist, for example), a pool of 
scientific representations might be collected and evaluated based on viewer 
interpretation. If a researcher wanted to investigate the role and influence of 
Technological-Cognitive-Modality ambiguities in this genre of scientific communication, 
he or she might begin with the definition of “modality” outlined in the taxonomy, tweak 
or refine it depending on the scope of the research and the scientific field which he or she 
represents, and proceed to determine frequencies, characteristics, and locations in which 
this type is found. Furthermore, this researcher may then survey participants viewing 
representations that exhibit this type of ambiguity. Of course, from there, the scientific 
communication researcher can further establish relationships and confidence limits that 
might eventually lead to statistically correlated results (depending on the type of visual 
ambiguity).  
 Some of the types of ambiguity outlined in the taxonomy, after all, will likely 
struggle to ever be effectively researched quantitatively—that is, correlations between 
some types of visual ambiguity (particularly those in the affective domain) and viewer 
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meaning-making may never be correlated to a behavior or response with clear and strong 
confidence limits. This is clear from the ongoing research about emotions and user 
experience design where great controversy is arising over whether or not aesthetic and 
emotive qualities of design such as “beauty” can be codified (Norman; Tractinsky; 
Hassenzahl; Kim; Shedroff). With these difficulties in mind, quantitative research of 
visual ambiguities, then, might often be reduced to establishing definitional properties of 
types and recognizing when and where these ambiguities are most present. However, 
much can be gleaned from qualitatively exploring types of ambiguity less clearly 
quantified. What a heuristic and taxonomy under the guise of visual ambiguity does is 
provide researchers a framework under which a more holistic understanding of how 
affective design elements work in tandem with cognitive design elements to influence 
meaning-making. 
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CHAPTER SIX  
AMBIGUOUS CONCLUSIONS 
 
“Science is the attempt to make the chaotic diversity of our sense-experience 
correspond to a logically uniform system of thought.”  
-Albert Einstein, Out of my Later Years  
 
Back to Reality: Ambiguity in Objective Science 
So where does an ambiguous taxonomy and an ambiguous heuristic lead us? To 
ambiguous conclusions, of course. The evaluative model set forth for analyzing how 
visual representations affect interpretation of scientific phenomena clearly does not 
follow traditional scientific method. In fact, the recurrence and seemingly omnipresence 
of ambiguity in the taxonomy and Tetradic Model of visual ambiguity presented may 
instill pejorative reactions in those seeking clear scientific results. After all, doesn’t such 
an ambiguous process assume that we may never fully grasp the nature of the 
phenomenon we observe, nor how visuals affect meaning-making in viewers? And if this 
is the case, doesn’t that contradict the largely embraced logic that the value of science is 
that it codifies an objective reality? Or that the value of critical heuristics is that they 
provide a measure of order to a subjective realm of experience? Or, even more damning 
to science, doesn’t this assume that the ubiquitous presence of ambiguity in scientific 
communication subverts science itself, and suggests that no scientific discovery can ever 
clearly represent reality (this was, of course, the fear of early empiricists like Sprat)? It 
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may seem, particularly to scientists, that the premise behind an entire work on ambiguity 
in science is built out of a deceptive (and perhaps irrational) syllogism: science must be 
communicated to be understood; communication is inescapably ambiguous; thus, science 
is inescapably ambiguous. At its extreme, such a premise might seem to imply that an 
objective reality cannot be understood at all and, hence, perhaps exist.  
To these very valid concerns, I hope my response is adequate: no. Ambiguity does 
not have to kill science, nor epistemologically throw scientific communication into chaos; 
at least it should not be intended to. One may certainly take the philosophical arguments 
to the extreme, but that would undermine the more practical value of a Tetradic Model of 
Visual Ambiguity might provide the scientific community.  For one of the values of a 
tetradic analysis of visual ambiguity is that it raises important ethical questions about 
how science is represented visually and how such knowledge, even if ambiguous, 
improves visual literacy. Stepping back (or away) from the Cartesian fears that 
empiricism cannot discover truth, we might rather look to ambiguity from a much more 
practical perspective where we hope to discover more about how truth is represented. 
Despite much of the literature and philosophies that circumnavigate topics like 
reality, truth, and objectivity, the pursuit of delineating a deeply philosophical perspective 
on ambiguity’s role in these ideologies was never the intention of this work (we can leave 
that discussion to the philosophers of science). Rather, ambiguity as it pertains to science 
has been explored in these chapters within strictly communicative realms for the purposes 
of rethinking and strengthening scientific visual literacy. Besides, the ubiquity of 
communicative ambiguity is not necessarily a new discussion, and it has not ruined 
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science. Really, a discussion about visual ambiguity in scientific representation should 
not be all that alarming to scientists, who have long recognized—as Francis Bacon did—
that words, whether we like it or not, will always, somehow “[obstruct] the 
understanding” (XLIII). As scientific communication itself continues to evolve into a 
more mature discipline, much is already being embraced in regards to the non-specificity 
(ambiguity) of communicative practices. Penrose and Katz, in their textbook Writing in 
the Sciences, for example, repeatedly point to how rhetoric, social systems, values, 
technologies, and argumentation—all of which contribute to ambiguous 
communication—are a normal part of shaping science.  This dissertation has merely 
sought to expand this understanding, though with a particular insight into the specific 
challenges of working with visual ambiguity. 
 The scope of this dissertation, then, is being played with in its title: Ambiguous 
Science and the Visual Representation of the Real. The aim has been to more thoroughly 
recognize how communicating the real world is affected by ambiguous representation. 
Science itself doesn’t necessarily have to be ambiguous for the communication of it to be. 
“The real” in the title is the objective scientific phenomena that representations seek to 
mimic but fail to, with precision, mimetically do so. “Ambiguous science” represents the 
signified interpretations that “the real” becomes after being mediated by visual 
representations. In essence, the purview of this dissertation has been to explore methods 
for improving our understanding of visual communication in the sciences through the 
lens of ambiguity. What has been discovered is that visual ambiguity in scientific 
communication should not be viewed as a hindrance to science. Ambiguity, after all, has 
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been shown to function as a space in which meaning is constructed. Without it, 
productive insights and revelations about scientific phenomena may be blockaded. The 
multiplicities of meanings within visual representations of science necessarily spark 
curiosities—they teach, inform, and raise awareness. Anomalies (that Kuhn suggests 
open doors into new paradigmatic understandings) could not happen without such 
ambiguities. “What handier…resource,” Burke asks, “could a rhetorician want than an 
ambiguity whereby he can say ‘The state of affairs is substantially such-and-such,’ 
instead of having to say ‘The state of affairs is and/or is not such-and-such?” (52).  
 Such a question also might make us ponder: how does visual communication 
epistemologically provide “substance” to scientific phenomena? Much like Kenneth 
Burke’s textual antinomies of definitions, visual elements within representations garner 
substance through “antinomies” of representation. After all, the more an image might be 
said to concurrently represent (even if there is ostensibly only one subject being 
represented), the more there may be to learn from the image, and thus the more we might 
learn about the science behind it. Visual ambiguities qualify the meanings of visual 
elements, such that the communicator’s awareness of the complexity of the 
representation’s relationship with the scientific object, increases. Visual ambiguities give 
power not only to the scientist who seeks to visually represent phenomenon, but also to 
the communicator and the viewer because of the increased awareness about what is 




Limitations and Future Research  
Investigating ambiguity as an integral part to scientific communication, however, does 
not come without its limitations. Harnessing our understanding of ambiguity’s influence 
in science, after all, is not made easy by simply producing a taxonomy and rhetorical 
tetrad. The Taxonomy and Tetradic Model that I developed is a heuristic, aimed to 
provide, like most other taxonomies, a somewhat tangible resource for improving 
discourse—and thus literacy—in the visual communication of science. Regardless of how 
we might try to frame ambiguity in scientific communication, however, we will never be 
able to fully control it. Application of a taxonomy and rhetorical model of visual 
ambiguity, really, is not near as important as the proposition made in Chapter 1: that we 
first and foremost embrace visual ambiguity as a real and important part of scientific 
communication discourse. The Tetradic Model of Visual Ambiguity provides us with a 
language to talk about ambiguity, but its applicability, in many ways, stops there. The 
taxonomy may expose us to communicative elements that had evaded us, or that we 
ignored, but it cannot show us how to remove their ambiguity.  
 As I have shown, the eradication of ambiguity is not possible. Nor is it necessary 
or even desirable. Altering or “removing” a type of visual ambiguity will only create 
other types, after all. It may be said, then, that this taxonomy of visual ambiguity simply 
becomes a tool for perpetually reassigning types of visual ambiguity. Simply put, it does 
not solve anything. Fixed solutions are rare in science, if they exist at all. In science, there 
are ideas, paradigms, and discoveries; but there are also always new variables, new 
ambiguities, to keep moving science along, and keep it from stagnating.     
 144 
 The proposed Tetradic Model of Visual Ambiguity is but one perspective for 
looking at visual representations of science. It draws from a (albeit carefully selected) 
hodgepodge of scholarship within and without the sciences. Its potential relies on specific 
disciplines’ willingness to adapt and modify the ambiguously definitional boundaries—
drawing from their own carefully selected scholarship—in which domains, dimensions, 
and types are described. Awareness of the ambiguities present in representations has a 
powerful ability to shape the way disciplines understand their scientific practice, 
particularly those communicative. Visual ambiguities are not necessarily just design 
mistakes or confusions, but rather they are spaces in which the abstractness and 
vagueness of science can be made clear. Paradoxically, then, visual ambiguities 
epistemologically become a discipline’s understanding of what is real.  But to adequately 
improve the discourse and literate awareness of ambiguities in a particular discipline, a 
far more thorough establishment of the domains, dimensions, and types would need to be 
established. The tetradic analysis of visual ambiguity outlined in Chapter 4 was a non 
discipline-specific, abbreviated example of what might function as a proposed model, but 
by no means a definitive one. 
 But perhaps one of the most conspicuous limitations of the Tetradic Model of 
visual ambiguity for investigating visual representations of science is the cumbersome 
nature of its application. In Chapter 5, the taxonomy and Tetrad were applied to only one 
visual element (the duotone) in Barker’s “Osteoporosis” image. One can imagine the 
difficulty of analyzing an image where hundreds of visual elements may be surfaced in a 
single representation and applied to potential scores of types of visual ambiguity in 
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varying dimensions and domains. Furthermore, my analysis in Chapter 5 addressed only 
one image. Far more would have to undergo a similar Tetradic Analysis before any 
generalizations could be made. 
 It seems, then, that if we are to take seriously visual ambiguity as an important 
part of the scientific communication discourse, we must more thoroughly develop 
heuristics in which it can practically and easily be applied and researched across a wide 
swath of visual representations from all scientific disciplines. At the very least, we will 
need to be patient as disciplines work to develop their own taxonomies of visual 
ambiguity and highlight the kinds of visual investigations they wish to pursue.     
 In conclusion, I wish to evoke an old axiom credited to the German dramatist 
Gotthold Lessing (but made famous by Albert Einstein in a 1946 edition of Science 
Illustrated [Einstein 99]): “The search for truth is more precious than its possession.” 
Visual representations of science, so long as they are influenced by visual ambiguities, 
may seemingly communicate an ambiguous science. But the great power and wonder of 
this is that ambiguous science, through the visual representation of the real, will always 
allow us to reshape and rethink scientific possibilities. Ambiguity, then, at its core, is a 
truly valuable aspect of human inquiry because it encourages exploration and the “search 
for truth” even if we never come to possess it. In an era of ubiquitous visualization, 
exploration into visual ambiguities may provide a new and important perspective into 
how scientific communication shapes science itself. The way in which scientific 
communicators familiarize themselves with it, become aware of it, and appreciate its 
effects, after all, has potential to shape the way they understand and represent their own 
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fields of inquiry. Preservation and appropriate application of visual ambiguity may, then, 
have increasingly important functions in the way we make ethical decisions about 
representing scientific phenomena.  A Tetradic Model of visual ambiguity is not 
necessarily the only or best solution. But it might move us toward a strengthened visual 
literacy in a world that is quickly embracing the value of and seeking insight into the 
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